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Arbitration law in the United States is far more controversial when applied
to individuals than to businesses. While enforcement of arbitration agreements
between businesses sometimes raises legal issues that divide courts, those issues
tend to interest only scholars, lawyers, and other specialists in the field of arbi-
tration. In contrast, enforcement of arbitration agreements between a business
and an individual (such as a consumer or employee) raises legal issues that
interest many members of Congress and various interest groups, all of whom
have taken positions on significant proposals for law reform. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has extensively researched and reported on con-
sumer arbitration agreements and is expected to issue a rule regulating, or even
prohibiting, such agreements.
This Article both explains how issues surrounding consumer and other ad-
hesive arbitration agreements became divisive along predictable political lines
and introduces a framework to understand and compare various positions on
them. This new framework arrays on a continuum five positions on the level of
consent the law should require before enforcing an arbitration agreement
against an individual. Progressives generally would require higher levels of
consent than arbitration law currently requires, while conservatives generally
defend current arbitration law’s low standards of consent.
This Article proposes a centrist position. It joins progressives in rejecting
overbroad enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements due to conservative-
supported anomalies in arbitration law’s treatment of contract-law defenses, le-
gally-erroneous decisions, and class actions. Once these anomalies are fixed,
though, this Article joins conservatives in defending general enforcement of ad-
hesive arbitration agreements under contract law’s standards of consent because
adhesive arbitration agreements should—contrary to progressive opinions—be
as generally enforceable as other adhesion contracts. This Article briefly con-
cludes by proposing language for a rule the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau could adopt to enact the reforms advocated in this Article.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),1 enacted in 1925, requires courts
to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”2 Since the
1980s, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this requirement to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in “contracts of adhesion,”3 the form con-
tracts drafted by businesses and presented to consumers, employees, and
others on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.4 Courts sometimes hold particular adhe-
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). The FAA, originally called the United States Arbitration Act,
was enacted in 1925.
2 Id. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
3 For the classic definition of “contract of adhesion,” see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983). Some lawyers
use the term “contract of adhesion” “to refer to a contract that is not only adhesive but also
grossly unfair. This misuse of the term creates confusion. Probably most contracts of adhesion
are simple and reasonable.” JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS
§ 9.43, at 348 n.3 (6th ed. 2009).
4 See infra Part II, notes 42–46. R
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sive arbitration agreements unenforceable on grounds, such as unconsciona-
bility, “for the revocation of any contract.” Most cases, however, find no
such ground applicable. Thus, they enforce the adhesion contract, requiring
arbitration rather than litigation between the parties.5 For decades now, fed-
eral and state courts have applied the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
FAA to enforce a wide variety of adhesive arbitration agreements in con-
sumer, employment, and other contracts.6
This widespread enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements is di-
visive, largely along predictable political lines. The FAA—originally drafted
by counsel to the New York Chamber of Commerce7—was enacted in a
conservative era nearly a century ago. President Coolidge captured the spirit
of the times when he said “[t]he business of America is business.”8 Current
defenders of the FAA, including its application to adhesion contracts, tend to
be business-oriented conservatives.9 In contrast, proposals to regulate more
5 See, e.g., Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause As Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 531, 529–33 (2014) (“Courts . . . have turned arbitration clauses into a type of ‘super
contract.’ Although courts purport to apply general contract law when interpreting arbitration
clauses, they have in fact distorted contract law by creating special rules for arbitration clauses
that make them enforceable in situations where other contracts are not.”); Susan Landrum,
Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the
Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 755–56 (2014)
(“[S]ome legal scholars have evaluated state courts’ application of the unconscionability doc-
trine to arbitration agreements and have come to the conclusion that courts still often apply
unconscionability in a way that demonstrates hostility to arbitration. . . . [H]owever, such an
approach may have the tendency to focus on outliers that are not necessarily representative.”);
Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania? Protecting Procedurally Fair Arbitration in a Con-
sumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 348 (2005) (“The problem remains
that contract defenses have neither effectively nor efficiently policed the fairness of arbitration
agreements. . . . Courts do not consistently apply contract defenses to ensure the consensual
nature or fairness of MH and other consumer arbitration provisions.”); Paul Weitzel, The End
of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through Arbitra-
tion Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. REV. 65, 111–12 (2013) (“Once a court
finds an agreement to arbitrate, that agreement must be ‘rigorously enforced,’ and ‘any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ This strong policy favoring arbitration will make it
difficult for any defense to succeed.”).
6 Under the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the United States Constitution’s Commerce
Clause and the FAA, the FAA’s preemption of inconsistent state law leaves little room for state
courts to enforce state law opposing enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements. See gen-
erally Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 482
U.S. 483 (1984); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
7
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, IN-
TERNATIONALIZATION 15 (1992); Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamin-
ing the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 130
(2002) (“The author of the first draft of the FAA was Julius Henry Cohen, general counsel for
the New York Chamber of Commerce and member of the ABA Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law.”).
8 JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA 247 (2002).
9 See infra Part II.
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tightly or even ban adhesive arbitration agreements tend to be supported by
progressives.10
In recent years, opponents of adhesive arbitration agreements have en-
joyed partial success by persuading Congress to enact several exceptions to
the FAA’s enforcement of them.11 For example, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
prohibited pre-dispute arbitration agreements in residential mortgages and
home-equity loans.12 More broadly, Dodd-Frank also created a new federal
agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),13 and author-
ized it to “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of” pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in all consumer financial services contracts.14
Consequently, all three branches of the federal government now have
significant power with respect to the law governing adhesive arbitration
agreements: Congress could create further exceptions to the FAA, amend it,
or even repeal it; the Supreme Court could amend or reverse its interpreta-
tions of the FAA; and the CFPB could promulgate regulations that exempt
many consumer transactions from the FAA’s enforcement of pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreements. Though any of these major changes is quite possible in
the next few years, the third seems most likely, because conservatives or
Republicans currently comprise majorities in both houses of Congress, while
the CFPB is directed by a Democrat appointed by the President who signed
the Dodd-Frank Act.15 Moreover, early indications suggest the CFPB is
likely “to either ban or to severely limit arbitration provisions in consumer
10 See id.
11 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–118,
§ 816(a), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009) (prohibiting defense contractors from including arbitration
clauses in employment contracts).
12 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1964 (2010) (“No residential mortgage loan and no extension of
credit under an open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the con-
sumer may include terms which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the
method for resolving any controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”).
13 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ [perma.cc/7FGH-VP3X]. The Bureau is an
independent agency that operates under a director appointed by the President with Senate con-
sent; it has investigatory, rulemaking, and enforcement powers. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a)–(c),
5492(a) (2012).
14 12 U.S.C. §§ 5518(a)–(c) (2012); see also CFPB Launches Public Inquiry into Arbitra-
tion Clauses, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-
into-arbitration-clauses/ [perma.cc/J2H4-UHPJ]; The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1964 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5301–5587 and miscellaneous provisions).
15 158 CONG. REC. E1419, 1420 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2012) (statement of Rep. Kaptur) (“At-
torney General Richard Cordray, a Democrat . . . .”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reregulation &
the Business Firm Symposium: Financial Institutions: The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of
State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 IOWA J. CORP. L. 893, 895
(2011) (“On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.”).
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financial service contracts.”16 So while this Article’s reasoning and proposals
for reform are written for Congress and the Supreme Court as much as for
the CFPB, this Article also offers the CFPB the language of a rule that the
CFPB could enact to accomplish the reforms proposed in this Article.17
These proposed reforms are politically centrist. As noted above, the
current widespread enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements tends to
be supported by conservatives while proposals to regulate more tightly or
even ban adhesive arbitration agreements tend to be advocated by progres-
sives.18 This ideological divide fits a century-long pattern in which regula-
tion of consumer, employment, and other adhesive contract terms is
advocated by progressives who tend to see such regulation as protecting vul-
nerable people from rapacious businesses, rather than by conservatives who
tend to see regulation of adhesion contract terms as raising costs to, and
restricting the freedom of, both parties to the contract.19 Because in the
United States adhesion contracts often implicate one’s political philosophy,
disagreements about them can be profound. Such disagreements are not
compromised easily and finding a moderate middle ground acceptable to
both sides is a difficult task. With respect to adhesive arbitration agreements,
this Article undertakes that difficult task.
16 Christine A. Scheuneman, Amy L. Pierce & Joseph T. Lynyak, III, CFPB’s Arbitration
Study—A Warning to Consumer Financial Service Companies, PILLSBURY LAW (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/cfpbs-arbitration-study-a-warning-to-consumer-fi-
nancial-service-companies [perma.cc/Y5SS-XDUG]. The CFPB issued a report in March
2015. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PUR-
SUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a)
(Mar. 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-con-
gress-2015.pdf [perma.cc/NXC5-726F]. Reactions to the CFPB report anticipate regulation or
even prohibition of many consumer pre-dispute arbitration agreements. See The Trial Lawyer
Financial Protection Bureau?, U.S. CHAMBER COM., INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Mar. 11,
2015), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-trial-lawyer-financial-protection-
bureau- [perma.cc/688K-N4K2] (“The [CFPB] report on arbitration released this week has
one very clear conclusion: litigation is better than arbitration. This raises the question of
whether the exercise has been less about protecting consumers and more about helping the
plaintiffs’ lawyers.”); David F. Freeman, Jr. et al., CFPB Releases Much Anticipated Arbitra-
tion Clause Study, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP (Mar. 2015), http://www.arnoldporter.com/re-
sources/documents/ADV13Mar2015CFPBReleasesMuchAnticipatedArbitrationClauseStudy
.pdf [perma.cc/U488-E5B9] (“In our view, the CFPB’s report foreshadows potential regula-
tion of arbitration clauses in contracts for consumer financial products and services.”); Eric
Mills & Joshua Davey, CFPB Releases Study on Use of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts, SUBJECT TO INQUIRY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/cfpb/cfpb-
releases-study-on-use-of-arbitration-clauses-in-consumer-contracts/ [perma.cc/RNU9-2YS9]
(“[I]t seems nearly certain that the CFPB will attempt to restrict the use of arbitration require-
ments in consumer contracts.”); Nancy Thomas & James McGuire, CFPB Releases Arbitration
Study Report to Congress, MORRISON FOERSTER ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Mar. 12, 2015), http://
www.moforeenforcement.com/2015/03/cfpb-releases-arbitration-study-report-to-congress/
[perma.cc/FJH9-LU6J] (“[T]he CFPB’s report lays the groundwork for the CFPB to issue
regulations prohibiting or limiting the use of such clauses.”).
17 See infra Part V.
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part II & note 75. R
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This Article begins with a plea that progressives and conservatives ac-
knowledge two truths in the phrase “adhesion contracts” and accept that
arbitration law should reconcile these two truths in much the same way our
law as a whole does. The two truths in the phrase “adhesion contracts” are
(1) that they are contracts and (2) they are adhesive, drafted by businesses
and presented to consumers, employees, and other adhering parties on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Both of these truths are deeply woven into federal
and state law. Adhesion contracts are contracts, because most of their terms
are routinely enforced by courts throughout the country.20 On the other hand,
the fact that adhesion contracts are adhesive typically raises courts’ readiness
to deny enforcement to some of their terms on contract-law grounds like
unconscionability.21 And legislatures’ widespread sense that courts need help
policing the terms of adhesion contracts leads to the enactment of many
statutes and regulations prohibiting various terms that were previously found
in adhesion contracts.22 Indeed the entire body of consumer law consists
largely of statutes and regulations prohibiting various adhesion contract
20 See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(“[C]ontracts of adhesion are well accepted in the law and routinely enforced . . . .”); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981) (“Standardization of agreements
serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services; both are essential
to a system of mass production and distribution.”); Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Con-
tract and Tort Law: Toward A Theory of Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 50 (2010)
(“[M]ost courts, regard even take-it-or-leave-it, standard form agreements, formed between
powerful legal entities and relatively powerless natural persons, as not only prima facie valid,
but moreover as boons for social utility.”); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate,
2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 479 (2006) (stating that “[a]dhesion contracts are ubiquitous” and
“generally are enforced”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1314–15 (2005) (“[C]ourts routinely enforce standard form contracts
unless they give no notice of the fact that they contain terms that could affect the offeree’s
legal rights, or contain unconscionable or objectively unexpected terms.”); Raymond T. Nim-
mer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 848 (1998) (“Contracts of adhesion are routinely enforced. A con-
tract of adhesion analysis typically indicates that a court enforces the contract, but scrutinizes
its terms more closely for terms that are procedurally or substantively unconscionable.”).
21 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconsciona-
bility, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1258 (2003) (“In some cases, courts point to the adhesive
nature of form contracts as evidence that the terms therein are ‘involuntary’ and thus procedur-
ally unconscionable.”); id. at 1295 n.201 (“The majority of courts, however, find that the fact
that a contract is adhesive is not alone enough for a finding of procedural unconscionability.”);
Catherine Riley, Signing in Glitter or Blood?: Unconscionability and Reality Television Con-
tracts, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 106, 120 (2013) (“Habitually, courts assume
procedural unconscionability in contracts of adhesion . . . .”); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond
Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” As the Basis for Analyzing Unbar-
gained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 547 (2008) (noting
that California courts “equate the finding of a contract of adhesion with the finding of proce-
dural unconscionability”).
22 Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Con-
tract Law, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1054 (2014) (“Examples abound of laws and
regulations aimed at resolving the very concerns that have led courts to turn to bargaining-
power analysis. In a number of different areas, legislatures and agencies have prohibited con-
tracts from including terms deemed abusive to one of the parties.”).
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terms,23 as do fundamental doctrines of employment,24 labor,25 securities,26
and franchise law.27 The enormous growth over the last hundred years of
such legislation and agency rules regulating business is to a large extent the
result of policymakers’ decisions to prohibit enforcement of adhesive con-
tract terms that would have been enforced had unconscionability and other
contract-law doctrines been the only grounds on which to deny enforcement.
With the two truths in the phrase “adhesion contracts”—that they are
contracts, but also adhesive—firmly in mind, this Article’s basic premise is
that adhesive arbitration agreements should be treated like other adhesion
contracts. Because adhesion contracts generally are at least presumptively
enforceable in our law, so should adhesive arbitration agreements be at least
presumptively enforceable,28 and because adhesion contracts are generally
limited by our law, so adhesive arbitration agreements should be similarly
limited. After decades engaged in scholarly, policy, and litigation debates
about adhesive arbitration agreements,29 I have concluded that three of U.S.
(state and federal) law’s general limits on adhesion contracts are especially
pertinent to adhesive arbitration agreements.
(1) Because U.S. law generally only enforces adhesion contracts after
allowing the party opposing enforcement to argue contract-law de-
fenses to enforcement (such as unconscionability and misrepresen-
tation), adhesive arbitration agreements should only be enforced
23 Id. at 1054–55 (“State usury laws limit the amount of interest that lenders can charge to
certain types of borrowers. The Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) has issued regulations dic-
tating terms that must, and must not, be included in payday loans, credit card agreements, and
other consumer-oriented financial contracts.”).
24 Id. at 1055 (“The Occupational Safety and Health Act and minimum wage laws estab-
lish mandatory requirements for employment contracts.”).
25 An employee’s right to join a labor union may not be contracted away pre-dispute; so-
called “yellow dog” contracts are unenforceable under federal labor law. 29 U.S.C. § 103
(2012); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (Securities Act anti-waiver provision); 15 U.S.C. § 77cc(a)
(2012) (Securities Exchange Act anti-waiver provision: “Any condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule
or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
27 Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659,
680–81 (2013) (“[M]ost state statutes regulating franchise relationships prohibit franchisors
from requiring their franchisees to waive the franchisor’s liability for a violation of those state
franchise laws when entering into a franchise agreement.”); Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to
Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 912 (2014) (“Although similar to contracts, franchises differ
because franchise law entails certain mandatory rules (e.g., limitations on termination) and
attempts to deter renegotiation in ways that contract law generally does not.”).
28 See infra Part III.E & note 152. R
29 My experience in these debates includes testimony as an expert witness in court and
before both houses of Congress, as well as many academic symposia and law review articles,
and two books, including one in which I and three co-authors debated possible amendments to
the FAA. See EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J.
WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006).
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after allowing the party opposing enforcement to argue contract-
law defenses to enforcement;30
(2) Because U.S. law generally does not enforce adhesion contract
terms prohibiting appeal and thus trading away the right to correct
legally-erroneous decisions on certain claims, courts should not en-
force adhesive arbitration agreements trading away that right;31 and
(3) Because U.S. law generally does not routinely enforce adhesion
contract terms “waiving”—actually trading away32—the right to be
a part of a class action, courts should not routinely enforce adhesive
arbitration agreements trading away the right to be a part of a class
action.33
In sum, the fact that an adhesion contract contains an arbitration clause
should not, on these three topics, make it more or less enforceable than the
same contract would be without an arbitration clause. With few and rela-
tively uncontroversial exceptions,34 adhesive arbitration agreements should
be enforced no more broadly or readily than other adhesion contracts.
Part II of this Article provides a history of how current law governing
adhesive arbitration agreements developed and became divisive along pre-
dictable political lines. Part III introduces a framework to understand and
compare different views about the law governing adhesive arbitration agree-
ments. Basically, the views can be arrayed on a continuum about the level of
consent the law should require before enforcing an arbitration agreement
against an individual, such as a consumer or employee. Progressives gener-
ally would require higher levels of consent than arbitration law currently
requires, while conservatives generally defend current arbitration law’s low
standards of consent.
Part IV proposes an intermediate (or centrist) position. It joins progres-
sives in rejecting conservative-supported anomalies that enforce adhesive ar-
bitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts on the three
specific issues noted above: contract-law defenses; correcting legally-errone-
ous decisions; and class actions. Once these anomalies are fixed though,
adhesive arbitration agreements should—contrary to the progressive posi-
tion—be as generally enforceable as other adhesion contracts. In other
words, this Article joins conservatives in defending general enforcement of
adhesive arbitration agreements under contract law’s standards of consent.
Part V briefly concludes. Finally, this Article includes an appendix with the
language of a rule the CFPB could adopt to enact into law the reforms advo-
cated in this Article.
30 See infra Part III.F & note 153. R
31 See infra Part III.G.i & note 154. R
32 See infra note 139. R
33 See infra Part III.G.ii & note 155. R
34 See infra note 133 (discussing discovery, evidence, and jury). R
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II. THE POLITICAL DIVIDE OVER LAW GOVERNING ADHESIVE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Current law’s enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements tends to
be supported by the Right (conservatives) and opposed by the Left (progres-
sives). For example, the last Congress’s broadest bill to end enforcement of
adhesive arbitration agreements, the Arbitration Fairness Act, had twenty-
four co-sponsors in the Senate, none of whom were Republicans.35 Support-
ers of this bill, versions of which have been introduced in many congresses,36
include generally progressive groups such as the AFL-CIO, ACLU, Alliance
for Justice, American Association for Justice (formerly American Trial Law-
yers Association), NAACP, and Public Citizen,37 while opponents of this bill
include generally conservative business-oriented groups such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and Ameri-
can Bankers Association.38 The interest-group battle over adhesive arbitra-
35 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
36 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873,
112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020,
111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002,
S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002).
37 Re: Support for the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Dec. 16,
2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/organizations-letter-judiciary-committee-arbitration-
fairness-act-2013.pdf [perma.cc/5PQ4-6D69]. The full list of organizations signing this letter:
9to5, AARP, AFL-CIO, Alliance for Justice, American Association for Justice, American As-
sociation of University Women, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Americans for
Financial Reform, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Center for Justice & Democracy,
Center for Responsible Lending, Citizen Works, Committee to Support the Antitrust Laws,
Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Watchdog, Consumers for
Auto Reliability and Safety, Consumers Union, ConsumersCount.org, D.C. Consumer Rights
Coalition, Home Owners for Better Building, Homeowners Against Deficient Dwellings, Le-
gal Aid Justice Center, Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition, MFY Legal Services, Inc.,
NAACP, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer Voice for Quality
Long-Term Care, National Consumer Law Center, National Consumers League, National Em-
ployment Law Project, National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), National Partner-
ship for Women & Families, National Women’s Law Center, NC Justice Center, People For the
American Way, Public Citizen, Reserve Officers Association (ROA), The Leadership Confer-
ence on Civil and Human Rights, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, West Virginia Citizen
Action Group.
38 Multi-Industry Letter Opposing the Onslaught of Anti-Arbitration Bills and Provisions
That Have Been Introduced in this Congress, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Apr. 30, 2008), https://
www.uschamber.com/letter/multi-industry-letter-opposing-onslaught-anti-arbitration-bills-
and-provisions-have-been [perma.cc/KJ6J-KQ3B]; see also Richard Gibson, Arbitration
Holds Steady for Franchising Disputes, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB124388471631873317 [perma.cc/8NSB-ZD4Q] (“The International
Franchise Association, franchisers’ primary trade organization, opposes the [2009 Arbitration
Fairness Act] bill, contending that it would “wreak havoc on a long-standing and effective
form of alternative dispute resolution.”); Lobby Spending Database for the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce for 2013, Specific Issue: Torts, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/clientissues_spec.php?id=D000019798&year=2013&spec=TOR [perma.cc/A6PS-
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tion agreements basically pits businesses against those who sue them, with
plaintiffs’ lawyers39 and law professors who had been plaintiffs’ lawyers
leading the research and arguments against adhesive arbitration agree-
ments.40 In the legislative arena, as well as in courtrooms around the country,
the “plaintiffs’ lawyers versus business” battle over adhesive arbitration
agreements has raged since the 1990s.41
The conservative/progressive divide in Congress and among interest
groups corresponds to the conservative/progressive divide on the Supreme
Court. The four most recent Supreme Court cases of great importance to
adhesive arbitration agreements show a highly partisan voting pattern. Two
of these cases, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant42 and
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,43 split the Court along completely parti-
san lines with all five justices appointed by Republican presidents voting to
enforce the adhesive arbitration agreements, while all four justices appointed
by Democratic presidents voted against enforcement.44 The same was true of
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,45 except that the four dissenters con-
sisted of the three Democratic-appointees then on the Court plus Justice Ste-
vens, who was appointed by President Ford—perhaps the last Republican
president who would not be considered solidly conservative today. So Rent-
A-Center seems to have split the Court along completely ideological lines.
7DH2]; Who Really Speaks for Consumers in the Arbitration Debate?, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COM., INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/re-
source/who-really-speaks-for-consumers-in-the-arbitration-debate/ [perma.cc/YN3G-7PJT].
39 See Tom Osborne & John Vail, The Menace of Mandatory Arbitration, TRIAL, Aug.
2004, at 22; Jeffrey Robert White, Mandatory Arbitration: A Growing Threat, TRIAL, July
1999, at 32; F. Paul Bland, Jr. & Michael J. Quirk, Securing Access to Justice, TRIAL LAWS.
FOR PUB. JUST. (2002), http://www.hiddenmysteries.org/money/aids/Mandatory_Arbitration
.pdf [perma.cc/5QQE-EDP3]; Paul Bland, Arbitrators are Answerable to No One, PUB. CITI-
ZEN CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 19, 2006, 8:14 AM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clp-
blog/2006/10/arbitrators_are.html [perma.cc/6SKJ-3LCR].
40 See, e.g., Paul Carrington, The Dark Side of Contract Law, TRIAL, May 2000, at 73, 77
(referring to “examples of how forced arbitration can hurt workers, consumers, and victims,
which can be used in educating the public and others about abuse of arbitration”); Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Pro-
cedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 108 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 722–23 (2012). See
generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitra-
tion: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Su-
preme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996).
41 Stephen J. Ware, The Alabama Story, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2001, at 24.
42 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
43 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
44 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2304, 2313 (Scalia, J., writing majority opinion;
Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.); Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740, 1753 (Scalia, J., writing majority opinion; Thomas, J., concurring;
Breyer, J., dissenting joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.).
45 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
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Similarly, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,46 the only dissenter from
enforcement of the adhesive arbitration agreement was a Democratic-ap-
pointee (Justice Ginsburg) and two of the other three Democratic-appointees
(Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) wrote a separate concurring opinion saying
“for the reasons stated by the dissent, I find this to be a much closer case
than the majority opinion suggests.”47 In short, the Supreme Court justices
have divided along almost completely partisan lines, and perhaps completely
ideological lines, throughout the last four cases which are most important to
adhesive arbitration agreements.48
In contrast to this recent partisan or ideological voting on the Court,
many of the earlier Supreme Court decisions important to adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements had pro-enforcement majorities consisting of at least seven
justices, including at least half of the justices appointed by Democratic presi-
dents.49 These cases, stretching from 1984 to 2006, are:
1. Southland Corp. v. Keating,50
46 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
47 Id. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
48 The most important of the less important cases is probably DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (reiterating Concepcion while overturning the California court’s argua-
bly stretching contract interpretation in attempt to avoid Concepcion), in which justices ap-
pointed by Democratic presidents split, while all justices appointed by Republican presidents
joined the majority, except for Justice Thomas who reliably dissents from holdings that the
FAA preempts state law.
A still less important case is Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201
(2012) (per curiam), which addressed no important new issues and merely corrected lower
court error about long-established law. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the
Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (2014) (“The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown had created
an exception to the FAA that was nowhere in the text of the statute and that wholly lacked
support in any prior Supreme Court precedent.”); id. (describing the West Virginia court’s
decision, overturned per curiam by the Supreme Court, as a “direct attack[ ] on the reasoning
of Supreme Court arbitration decisions” and “blatant”); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,
724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132
S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).
Another unimportant case (because it addressed no important new issues and merely cor-
rected lower court error about long-established law) is Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. How-
ard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam). See Drahozal, supra, at 11 (“The Oklahoma decision
in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard was flatly contrary to Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, in which the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator, rather than a court, is to
decide whether the main contract (i.e., the contract that includes the arbitration clause) is
illegal.”).
49 The one significant exception to this, and perhaps a precursor to the Court’s recent
partisan or ideological arbitration voting, was a consumer arbitration case, Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), in which the pro-enforcement majority con-
sisted of five Republican appointees while the four dissenters consisted of the two Democratic
appointees then on the Court plus Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, who was appointed by the
first President Bush.
50 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that FAA requires state court to compel arbitration of claim
despite state law to the contrary). Republican appointees in majority: Burger (author), Black-
mun, Brennan, and Powell; Democratic appointees in majority: Marshall and White.
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2. Perry v. Thomas,51
3. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,52
4. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,53
5. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,54 and
6. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.55
These decisions by broad pro-enforcement majorities on the Court,
from 1984 to 2006, produced enormous changes to arbitration law, espe-
cially to the law governing adhesive arbitration agreements. Prior to 1984,
such agreements were generally unenforceable, or at least unenforceable
with respect to many statutory claims.56 In contrast, by 2006 adhesive arbi-
tration agreements were routinely enforced with respect to all claims.57 So
the Supreme Court from 1984 to 2006 made major decisions to enforce ad-
hesive arbitration agreements, and it did so with substantial support from
Democratic-appointed justices. In fact, the majority opinions in four of the
six cases just listed (Perry, Gilmer, Allied-Bruce, and Doctor’s Associates)
were authored by Democratic-appointed justices.
This study of the justices’ votes suggests two conclusions. First, as big
as the Court’s 1984–2006 changes to adhesive arbitration law were, those
changes were not far out of step with the political center of that era. While
those Supreme Court decisions were criticized in plaintiffs’ lawyers’ jour-
nals, and by like-minded academics,58 such criticism did not persuade newly
appointed justices (including Democratic-appointed Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer) to vote to undo what earlier-appointed justices had done. Nor did
criticism of the Court’s 1984–2006 change to enforcing adhesive arbitration
agreements move Congress to undo by statute any large part of what the
Court had done, although Congress did prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute
51 482 U.S. 483 (1987). Republican appointees in majority: Rehnquist, Brennan, Black-
mun, Powell, and Scalia; Democratic appointees in majority: Marshall (author) and White.
52 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (enforcing adhesive arbitration agreement against employee seeking
to sue employer). Republican appointees in majority: Rehnquist, Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter; Democratic appointees in majority: White (author). Marshall was the
only other Democratic appointee on the Court.
53 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that FAA preemption of state law encompasses full scope
of Constitution’s Commerce Clause). Republican appointees in majority: Rehnquist, Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter; Democratic appointees in majority: Breyer (author) and
Ginsburg.
54 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA preempts state law requiring adhesive arbitra-
tion agreements to be on contract’s first page and in large font). Republican appointees in
majority: Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter; Democratic appointees
in majority: Ginsburg (author) and Breyer.
55 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding that FAA preempts state law ruling that consumer finance
arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to usury). Republican appointees in majority:
Scalia (author), Roberts, Stevens, Souter, and Kennedy; Democratic appointees in majority:
Ginsburg and Breyer.
56
STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.6–2.14,
2.27–2.28 (2d ed. 2007).
57 Id.
58 See supra notes 39–40. R
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arbitration agreements in two very narrow situations: motor vehicle
franchise agreements between automobile manufacturers and dealers,59 and
the credit agreements of military personnel.60 In sum, the Supreme Court’s
1984–2006 decisions may have pushed arbitration law—including law on
adhesive arbitration agreements—a bit to the right of center, but apparently
not very far right of center.
In contrast, the current Supreme Court’s Republican-appointed justices
now seem farther from the political center on law governing adhesive arbi-
tration agreements. This is the second conclusion suggested by the above
study of the justices’ votes. As noted above, the last four cases important to
adhesive arbitration agreements have divided the justices along almost com-
pletely partisan lines and perhaps completely ideological lines, without the
broad bipartisan support (from Democratic-appointed justices) enjoyed by
earlier decisions enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements.61 In addition, the
nation’s political center itself probably moved left after 2006, at least with
respect to the area of law most focused on adhesion contracts—consumer
law. While 2006 began with a Republican president and Republican majori-
ties in both houses of Congress, the years immediately following 2006 in-
cluded the financial crisis and the Great Recession62 (both of which were
widely blamed on lenders exploiting consumers63), the election of President
Obama, and the Dodd-Frank Act,64 which may have been the single biggest
59 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever
a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy
arising out of or relating to such contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy
only if after such controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to use
arbitration to settle such controversy.”).
60 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2012) (“Notwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Fed-
eral or State law, rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving the exten-
sion of consumer credit shall be enforceable against any covered member or dependent of such
a member, or any person who was a covered member or dependent of that member when the
agreement was made.”).
61 See supra notes 42–57. R
62 The financial crisis is often dated around the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
2008 to 2013: Crisis, Recovery, and Change, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (2013), http://www
.businessweek.com/features/financial-crisis-anniversary-2013/ [https://perma.cc/52MH-
BM4E]; see also Marketplace Staff, Lehman’s Legacy: A Timeline of How the Financial Crisis
Unfolded, MARKETPLACE.ORG (Sept. 11, 2013, 7:31 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/
economy/after-lehman/lehman%E2%80%99s-legacy-timeline-how-financial-crisis-unfolded
[https://perma.cc/K85C-FSZ3]. The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June
2009. Business Cycle Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research, NAT’L BU-
REAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html [https:/
/perma.cc/HZ6X-KXTR].
63 Editorial, When a Car Loan Means Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/when-a-car-loan-means-bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/
JJ7A-KL4S] (“The mortgage industry set the stage for the recession by luring people into
ruinously priced loans they could never hope to repay, then selling those loans to Wall Street
in mortgage-backed securities that went bad.”); Zachary A. Goldfarb & Brady Dennis, Gov-
ernment Report Blames Regulators and Financial Institutions for Economic Crisis, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/27/AR
2011012702940.html [https://perma.cc/A2LJ-CBVQ].
64 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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leftward movement of consumer law since at least the 1970s.65 With respect
to consumer arbitration, the Dodd-Frank Act:
• generally banned the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in res-
idential mortgages and home-equity loans;66
• prohibited enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the
context of certain whistleblowers;67 and
• created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau68 and authorized it
to “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of” pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in many consumer financial services
contracts.69
The Democratic congress that passed Dodd-Frank also enacted a Defense
Appropriations Act that prohibited large military appropriations to any con-
tractor that requires its employees agree to arbitrate as a condition of
employment.70
In sum, since 2006 the nation’s political center on consumer law seems
to have moved left while the Republican-appointed justices’ decisions on
adhesive arbitration agreements have continued moving right. This diver-
gence would be reduced or perhaps eliminated if this Article’s proposals
were adopted. For that reason, I describe this Article’s proposals as
“centrist.”
However, I do not advocate these proposals solely, or even primarily,
because they would bring law governing adhesive arbitration agreements
back toward the nation’s political center. I do not believe this or any area of
law should constantly seek the center, because that would require legal rules
constantly to change with the direction of the prevailing political winds.
Such change would be bad because stability is an important virtue in the
law. But those who prudently value stability in the law should, like Edmund
Burke, be as skeptical of the absence of legal change as of constant or rapid
65
DOUGLAS WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW, at xxiv (7th ed.
2013) (“[I]n 2010 a new phase of consumer law began, the most important since the 1960s.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act . . . and the
existing rules underwent a tectonic shift. The need for Dodd-Frank arose from the Great Reces-
sion of 2008 when subprime lending collapsed the markets and millions of people were thrown
out of work.”); Viral Acharya et al., A Critical Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, VOXEU.ORG (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.voxeu.org/
index.php?q=node/5692 [https://perma.cc/NY9B-D5JW] (“In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act
passed earlier this year represents the most sweeping set of reforms to the US financial sector
since the Great Depression.”).
66 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012).
67 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012).
68 See Creating the Consumer Bureau, supra note 13. R
69 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
70 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 816(a),
123 Stat. 3409 (2009).
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legal change.71 In that Burkean spirit of cautious, incremental law reform,
this Article offers centrist proposals that I believe would move adhesive ar-
bitration law from its current position on the right to about where I believe
the center is.
To reiterate though, moving law toward the center is not my primary
purpose in making these proposals. Rather, these proposals are what I be-
lieve would be good policy. Most of these beliefs are long-held, and I have
advocated some of them before.72 I believe the positions I advocate in this
Article rest on the principle that has long animated my normative arbitration
scholarship—what I call the “contractual approach”73 to arbitration law,
which is that arbitration agreements should generally be as enforceable as
other contracts, rather than more or less enforceable. Applying this principle
to adhesive arbitration agreements yields a set of proposals that I hope is
timely and congenial to the CFPB, Congress, and the Supreme Court—all of
whom make law governing adhesive arbitration agreements.74
III. FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND THE ARBITRATION DEBATE:
REQUIRING DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CONSENT TO
TRADE AWAY THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE
A. Five Positions on a Left-Right Continuum
As noted above, the ideological divide over adhesive arbitration agree-
ments fits a century-long pattern in which regulation of adhesion contract
71 See Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in 19 RETHINKING THE
WESTERN TRADITION (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (“A state without the
means of some change is without the means of its conservation. Without such means it might
even risk the loss of that part of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to pre-
serve.”); Brad Masters, Reconciling Originalism with the Father of Conservatism: How Ed-
mund Burke Answers the Disruption Dilemma in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1061, 1073–74 (2013) (“Burke faced a dilemma. Philosophic and institutional evolution
is both natural and desirable; yet, change can exact significant, retrogressive costs on society.
Burke navigated this problem by advocating for gradual change and respect for precedent.”
(footnotes omitted)).
72 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B.
ON ARB. & MEDIATION 56 (2014); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine
After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107 (2007); Stephen J. Ware,
Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICH-
ARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88–126 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration
Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006).
73 Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
83, 86 (1996) (“Part III is an argument for a contractual approach to arbitration law—an
argument that arbitration law is, and ought to be, essentially a branch of contract law.”); Ste-
phen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1034 (1996) (“For two decades, the Supreme Court has ad-
vanced the contractual approach to arbitration law.” (footnote omitted)).
74 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. R
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terms is advocated by progressives who tend to see it as democratically pro-
tecting vulnerable people from rapacious businesses, rather than by conserv-
atives who tend to see such regulation as raising costs to, and restricting the
freedom of, both parties to the contract.75 Throughout this long-term debate
the relevant question, in its simplest form, is whether or not the law should
enforce various contract terms. When the contract term in question is an
agreement to arbitrate, the two polar positions (“always enforce them” and
“never enforce them”) are not the only possible positions. Rather, several
positions can be arrayed on a continuum largely corresponding to the level
of consent the law should require before enforcing an arbitration agreement
against a consumer, employee, or other individual. Below is a diagram of the
continuum, which summarizes five positions and labels them the Very Pro-
gressive Position, the Moderately Progressive Position, the Centrist Position,

























75 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Con-
sumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 829, 833 (2006) (“[T]he conservative side in the legal culture war believes customers
should insist on warranties to protect themselves against deceptive practices, and if they don’t,
caveat emptor . . . .”); Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About
the New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 13, 50 (2001) (“[R]ealist/progressive principles such as bad faith and unconscionability
crystallized into consumer protection legislation and agency regulation . . . .”); Robert Hock-
ett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (“Lochner infa-
mously favored libertarian-liberal freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de
facto bargaining power and consequent opportunity.” (footnote omitted)); Duncan Kennedy,
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and
Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 173 (2000) (“[C]ontract doctrine was the site . . . of a[ ] . . .
mildly ideologized debate between conservatives touting freedom of contract, on one side, and
liberals advocating policing bargains in the interests of weak parties, on the other.”); Margaret
H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 738 (2011) (“[T]here
is some evidence to suggest that the decision by an elected attorney general to take action in
the consumer-protection field is influenced by citizen ideology: Attorneys general from ‘lib-
eral’ states do more, while those from ‘conservative’ states do less.” (footnote omitted)); Mat-
thew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 231–32 (2010) (“If
there were no limits on what could be bargained for, this would be a serious problem. Such a
system would be a libertarian system (rather than liberal) that gives unrestricted freedom of
contract a place of pride. Liberal theories rightly reject such unrestricted freedom of contract.”
(footnotes omitted)); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law
Through A Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 198 (2010) (referring
to “the basic progressive tradition of consumer protection”).
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The next several pages explain the continuum and the five positions, after
first exploring the key concept: the right to litigate.
B. Trading Away the Right to Litigate
1. Settlement Agreements and Exculpatory Clauses
Litigation is the default process of dispute resolution in the sense that
parties can contract into alternative processes of dispute resolution, but if
they do not, then each party retains the right to have the dispute resolved in
litigation.76 The right to litigate is important, especially in the United
States.77 Access to courts is basic to our system of government.78
The right to litigate is alienable. For example, a settlement agreement is
an agreement through which the plaintiff (or other claimant) alienates her
right to litigate her claim against the defendant. Typically, the defendant
pays the plaintiff money or some other consideration in exchange for the
plaintiff trading away her right to litigate that claim. In other words, a settle-
ment is essentially a plaintiff contractually negating her claim against a de-
fendant by trading away the right to litigate it.
76 Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, supra note 72, at 59; see also R
Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories of Private
Judging, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 163, 165 (2011) (“The default form of dispute resolution is
litigation. Parties resolve their disputes in court unless they agree otherwise. Arbitration is
often described as an alternative means of dispute resolution. Instead of parties relying on a
public court judge to issue a final and binding decision, they hire an arbitrator (or arbitrators)
to do so. By agreeing to arbitrate, parties override the litigation default rule.” (footnotes
omitted)).
77 The judiciary and litigation have long played a larger role in the United States than in
other democracies. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 13 (2001) (“[V]iewed in the comparative perspective, the United States is distinc-
tive . . . . It is especially inclined to authorize and encourage the use of adversarial litigation to
. . . resolve disputes.”); id. (“Adversarial legalism gives the United States the most politically
and socially responsive court system in the world . . . . [T]he judiciary and lawyers [are] more
fully part of the governing process and more fully democratic in character.”); Developments in
the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2004, 2012 (2013) (“[T]he judiciary has played a much more significant role in the United
States [than in Europe].”); David Nelken, Beyond Compare? Criticizing “The American Way
of Law”, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 799, 819 (2003) (“[I]f we were trying to draw any general
lesson from studying the range of law and governance structures in modern democracies . . . .
What we can be certain of is that in these other places lawyers are less central and litigation is
allowed a much smaller role than in the United States.”).
78 Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2818 (2015) (“Constitutional text,
doctrine, and common law traditions establish the authority of individuals to bring claims to
courts and the obligation of courts to welcome third parties to observe their proceedings. State
constitutions regularly linked the two forms of access by mandating rights-to-remedies in open
courts.”).
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Courts’ routine enforcement of settlement agreements emphasizes the
alienability of the right to litigate.79 However, settlement agreements are
formed after a dispute has arisen. In contrast, pre-dispute agreements to ne-
gate claims by trading away the right to litigate them are often unenforce-
able.80 A pre-dispute agreement to negate claims—especially when that
agreement is just one clause of a broader contract—is typically called an
“exculpatory clause.” Exculpatory clauses are often unenforceable. As
David Schwartz writes,
Courts generally hold contract clauses to be void as against public
policy if their effect is to exempt a party from liability for its own
future fraud or intentional torts, violations of statute, and injuries
caused by gross negligence or recklessness. Exculpatory clauses in
contracts are enforceable only to the extent that they cover simple
negligence, and even then with significant limitations.81
For example, a California statute prohibits enforcement of contracts that
“exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to
79 “[C]ourts are generally happy to bless the parties’ settlement without inquiring about
its terms.” WARE, supra note 56, at § 2.47 (citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & R
Tr. Co., 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987)) (“The fairness of a settlement of a legal dispute is
like the adequacy of the consideration supporting a contractual promise: a matter best left to
negotiation between the parties.”). See generally 15A C.J.S. COMPROMISE & SETTLEMENT § 33
(2014) (“As a general rule, a settlement agreement is considered valid and enforceable if it is
entered into in good faith, and courts will not invalidate settlement agreements absent a strong
showing that they violate good morals or the public interest because of error, bad faith, or
fraud.” (footnotes omitted)); Baptist v. City of Kankakee, 481 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that plaintiffs received value in exchange for the settlement of their claim, and there-
fore the Court will not inquire to adequacy of settlement terms); Russell v. United States, 320
F.2d 920, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (“Because it is not normally concerned with the soundness of a
compromise, the court customarily accepts stipulated settlements calling for judgments against
the United States, without any inquiry into the correctness of the legal principles or factual
assumptions on which the compromise may be founded.”); Trenton St. Ry. Co. v. Lawlor, 71
A. 234, 236 (N.J. 1908) (“The court will not inquire into the adequacy or inadequacy of the
consideration of a compromise fairly and deliberately made.”).
80 See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. R
81 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 112 (1997);
see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 139 (2013) (“Although courts would most likely uniformly invalidate as against
public policy exculpatory clauses that immunize intentional harm or reckless or grossly negli-
gent behavior . . . some courts now do enforce exculpatory clauses insofar as they apply to
merely negligent behavior.”). For a lengthier discussion of the same, see Michael A. Scodro,
Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 589–90 (2005) (foot-
notes omitted):
Certain rights cannot be traded away, at least prospectively, by the parties who enjoy
their protections. Often called “exculpatory” clauses, contract provisions waiving a
party’s right to sue are therefore frequently unenforceable. Congress and the courts
have made plain that parties cannot contract away the right to sue to vindicate any of
an array of statutory rights . . . . Many common law actions, including suits for
intentional, reckless, and even grossly negligent torts, also cannot be waived pro-
spectively. Often, courts allow actions for even common negligence to proceed not-
withstanding a predispute waiver.
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the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or
negligent . . . .”82 Despite this statute, however, California courts often en-
force contracts exculpating a party “from liability for ordinary negli-
gence . . . where no public interest is involved . . . and no statute expressly
prohibits it.”83 For example, courts generally enforce exculpatory clauses in
the recreational sports context.84 In contrast, the California Supreme Court
did not enforce an exculpatory clause in a contract between a hospital and an
entering patient because it held that contract affects the public interest.85
Why does our law routinely enforce post-dispute agreements to negate
claims (settlement agreements) but often not enforce pre-dispute agreements
to negate claims (exculpatory clauses)? Two major reasons come to mind.
First, the level of consent to settlement agreements tends to be very high.
Settlement agreements are formed post-dispute, and often after litigation has
begun. At this point, even the least sophisticated parties are likely advised by
a lawyer and focused on resolving a particular disputed claim. Thus, they are
likely to appreciate the main right they lose by settling: the right to continue
litigating the claim.86 So while a settling plaintiff may be an unsophisticated
or vulnerable consumer or employee negating her claim by trading away an
important right (the right to litigate it), such individuals consent to that trade
when they tend to have their greatest understanding of and appreciation for
that right.
In contrast, an exculpatory clause in a contract with many other clauses
is formed pre-dispute when a party who had no role in drafting the con-
tract—such as an unsophisticated or vulnerable consumer or employee—
may have little appreciation for the right to litigate and the exculpatory
clause’s negation of it. That individual may not even notice the exculpatory
clause in the contract, let alone understand it and reflect on it, much less
discuss it with counsel. Relatedly, the contract containing the exculpatory
clause is part of a transaction with a benefit (such as a product or a loan of
82 Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 (2013); see also Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448
N.E.2d 413, 416 (N.Y. 1983) (discussing New York state law’s avoidance of exculpatory
clauses that insulate corporations from backlash for intentional or reckless wrongdoing).
83 Health Net of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 113 Cal. App. 4th 224, 243 (2003)
(citing 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW Contracts § 631 (9th ed. 1987)).
84 Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1258–59 (2002).
85 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1963).
86 Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, supra note 72, at 64–65; see R
Schwartz, supra note 81, at 116–17. R
An individual weighing an offer to settle a claim based on acts that have already
occurred has concrete wrongs to evaluate and is in a much better position to assess
the extent of her harm than an individual thinking about future potentialities. She has
more incentive to contact a lawyer. Particularly with legal representation, the person
who has already been injured is in a much better position to evaluate her legal
claims. A settlement can thus result from a bargain “in the shadow of the law,” that
is, taking into account the costs of potential litigation for both parties, the range of
outcomes before a judge or a jury, and the facts and issues of proof in light of the
legal standards.
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money) for the individual, but that benefit is probably not overtly tied to the
claim she is negating. So the individual may simply think she is receiving a
product or loan in exchange for her promise to pay money, as opposed to
having a more thorough understanding that the contract provides that she is
receiving the product or loan in exchange for all her promises in all the
contract’s clauses. In short, she may not realize that price is merely one term
of the contract and that other contract terms (such as an exculpatory clause)
likely affect the price at which the business is willing to contract.87
The second major reason our law routinely enforces (post-dispute) set-
tlement agreements but usually does not enforce exculpatory clauses (pre-
dispute settlement agreements) relates to deterrence. As Michael Scodro em-
phasizes, the deterrence goal of Congress or other lawmakers tends to:
loom[ ] particularly large before a dispute arises. At that point,
society’s primary interest in a putative right of action lies in its
ability to deter misconduct: “Remedies have both deterrent and
compensatory effects, but at different times in the process, deter-
rence or compensation may predominate. Prior to the existence of
a particular dispute, the potential availability of compensatory
remedies acts purely as a deterrent, telling potential defendants
how to order their conduct.”88
In contrast, “[s]ettlement after the fact is, of course, permissible . . . because
unlike ‘prospective waivers,’ [such as exculpatory clauses] settlements do
not ‘affect the public interest by diminishing deterrence.’” 89
2. Default Rules and Mandatory Rules
Professor Scodro writes “[t]he deterrent effect of nonwaivable rights is
of the utmost importance, not solely to the individual who may become the
87 That contract terms favorable to sellers go hand-in-hand with lower prices “has been
standard in the law-and-economics literature for at least a quarter of a century.” Stephen J.
Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 92 (2001); see also Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1203, 1206. R
Terms that govern the contractual relationship between buyers and sellers are attrib-
utes of the product in question, just as are the product’s price and its physical and
functional characteristics. Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully
rational decisionmakers, when making purchasing decisions they take into account
only a limited number of product attributes and ignore others. While sellers have an
economic incentive to provide the efficient level of quality for the attributes buyers
consider (“salient” attributes), they have an incentive to make attributes buyers do
not consider (“non-salient” attributes) favorable to themselves, as doing so will not
affect buyers’ purchasing decisions. Assuming that price is always a salient product
attribute for buyers, market competition actually will force sellers to provide low-
quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs that will be passed along to buy-
ers in the form of lower prices.
88 Scodro, supra note 81, at 591–92 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 81, at 118) (footnote R
omitted).
89 Id. at 591 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 81, at 118) (footnotes omitted). R
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victim of misconduct, but also to third parties and to society generally.”90
Here lies the important distinction between mandatory rules of law and de-
fault rules.91 A mandatory (or “nonwaivable”) rule creates rights that cannot
be traded away in a pre-dispute contract, but can be traded away in a post-
dispute contract (such as a settlement agreement). In contrast, a default rule
creates rights that can be traded away in a pre- or post-dispute contract. For
example, in a sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, the de-
fault rule is that the seller’s place of business is the place for delivery of the
goods, but the parties can opt out of that default with a pre-dispute contract
term requiring delivery at some other location.92
Default rules are very common in contract and commercial law.93
Mandatory rules are common in many other areas of law, particularly in
areas of law—such as consumer, employment, labor, securities, and
franchise law—replete with statutes and regulations prohibiting various ar-
guably oppressive contract terms.94 These differing approaches fit a general
sense of contract and commercial law as allowing parties to a transaction the
contractual freedom to achieve their goals (even if those goals displease non-
90 Id. at 591.
91 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (distinguishing between “default”
rules, which parties can modify by contract, and mandatory or “immutable” rules, which “par-
ties cannot change by contractual agreement” (footnote omitted)).
92 U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Unless otherwise
agreed (a) the place for delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if he has none his
residence . . . .”).
93 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay et al., Litigating BP’s Contribution Claims in Publicly Subsi-
dized Courts: Should Contracting Parties Pay Their Own Way?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1955
(2011) (“In commercial-contract cases, most of the legal questions relate to ‘default
rules’ . . . .”); Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Con-
sumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41
TEX. INT’L L.J. 223, 266 (2006) (“Current Article 2 and contract law in general is premised on
the notion of freedom of contract and party autonomy.” (footnote omitted)); Edith R. Warken-
tine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and ‘Merchant/Consumers’
Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 44 (1996) (“Freedom of contract is a
guiding principle of the U.C.C.” (footnote omitted)); see also Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Mich. Live-
stock Exch., 439 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Mich. 1989) (quoting 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-2, at 135 (3d ed.)) (stating that in Article 2, “freedom of contract is
the rule rather than the exception”); Hayward v. Postma, 188 N.W.2d 31, 32 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) (“The general approach of Article 2 of the code is that freedom of contract
prevails . . . .”); Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank & Trust, 290 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.
2009) (“[T]he UCC recognizes freedom of contract and specifies that parties may vary ‘the
effect’ of UCC provisions by agreement, except as proscribed by the Code.”).
94 See supra notes 23–27; see also David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping R
Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49,
54 (2003).
Many regulatory statutes—particularly those protecting consumers or investors—
contain “anti-waiver” provisions that expressly guarantee against contract terms
purporting to waive the statutes’ protections. Even without such statutory provisions,
prospective waivers of such statutory protections are routinely struck down as un-
conscionable, void as against public policy, or simply because they would “‘nullify
the purposes’ of the statute.”
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parties) while other areas of law are more willing to regulate a contract (and
thus hinder at least one of the parties to it), not only to protect the other
contracting party but also to protect non-parties through deterrence. For
these reasons, exculpatory clauses are much more consistent with contract
and commercial law than with these other areas of law.
To put it another way, one can distinguish mandatory from default rules
by determining whether the right recognized by a particular rule can be the
subject of an enforceable exculpatory clause. If it can, then the right is
merely the default, but if the right cannot be the subject of an enforceable
exculpatory clause, then the right is protected by a mandatory rule. For ex-
ample, when a contract for the sale of goods specifies delivery at the buyer’s
place of business, the contract contains (although few speak of it this way)
an exculpatory clause in which the seller exculpates the buyer from liability
for the buyer’s failure to take delivery of the goods (“accept” the goods) at
seller’s place.95 This is just one of millions of examples of contracting around
default rules. Countless enforceable contract terms are in this sense enforce-
able exculpatory clauses because they contract around the default rule pre-
dispute. Exculpatory clauses, in this broad sense, are so common in contract
and commercial law that they are not typically called exculpatory clauses.
Instead the phrase “exculpatory clause” seems often used with a pejorative
connotation that suggests a clause purporting to contract around that which
perhaps should not be contracted around pre-dispute.
C. The Very Progressive Position on Arbitration: Enforce No Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Like a settlement agreement and an exculpatory clause, an arbitration
agreement also trades away the right to litigate. However, when parties form
an arbitration agreement they do not simply negate their claims but rather
replace their rights to litigate claims with rights to arbitrate claims. An arbi-
tration agreement can resemble a settlement agreement in being formed
post-dispute, when parties are most likely to appreciate the main right they
lose by forming the agreement—the right to continue litigating the dispute.96
95 U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“Tender of delivery is
a condition to the buyer’s duty to accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to
pay for them. Tender entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to
the contract.”).
96 See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 288 (2000) (“Because of the similarity in economic
terms between post-dispute arbitration agreements and settlement agreements, they should be
considered on the same terms in policy discussions. Arguments against post-dispute arbitration
agreements are economically indistinguishable from arguments against settlement.”); see also
Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for
Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 561 (1994) (“A post-dispute arbitration agreement is
tantamount to an agreement to allow a neutral to play a role in settling the dispute.”); C.
Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 422 (1987) (“Agreements to arbitrate existing disputes are
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However, most arbitration agreements are (like exculpatory clauses) formed
pre-dispute when parties’ understanding tends to be much lower.97
A pre-dispute arbitration agreement nearly always consists of an
arbitration clause among many non-arbitration clauses in a con-
tract. For example, a form contract prepared by Seller’s lawyer for
all of Seller’s sales of goods might include among its thirty
clauses, stretching over five pages, a clause requiring Seller and
Buyer to arbitrate, rather than litigate, any dispute arising out of or
relating to the transaction. When Buyer signs the form or other-
wise manifests assent to it, Buyer might not read the arbitration
clause, let alone understand it and reflect on it, much less discuss it
with counsel or negotiate it with Seller. In addition, a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is typically a broad agreement about how to
resolve any dispute that may arise between the parties, so it is
generally difficult—even for parties thinking about arbitration
while forming the contract—to anticipate all the possible disputes
that might arise and assess how a duty to arbitrate, rather than
litigate, will affect each of them.98
For these reasons, some believe that individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration
agreements should never be enforced. For instance, Jean Braucher asserted
that “[c]onsumer ‘choice’ of arbitration can only be meaningful if it is a
post-dispute choice, when the consumer is represented by counsel. . . . The
best way to reform arbitration systems is to make pre-dispute arbitration
clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts.”99 This position, opposition to
enforcing individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements, is the Very Pro-
closely akin to settlement agreements.”); Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration
Awards, supra note 72, at 65–66 (“A post-dispute arbitration agreement is essentially a settle- R
ment agreement that leaves some of its important terms unspecified until the arbitrator speci-
fies them.”).
97 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 209
(2006) (“[T]he use of post-dispute arbitration agreements is rare relative to the use of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regu-
lation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289, 346 (2012) (noting 96.3% of cases
arose out of pre-dispute agreements, while only 3.7% arose out of post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate); Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 319 (2003)
(analyzing the American Arbitration Association data on the infrequency of post-dispute arbi-
tration clauses in employment cases).
98 Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, supra note 72, at 63–64. R
99 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The Gateway
Thread—AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1167 (2000) (“Consumer ‘choice’
of arbitration can only be meaningful if it is a post-dispute choice, when the consumer is
represented by counsel who can evaluate the system’s rules. The best way to reform arbitration
systems is to make pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts, so that
the arbitration systems view consumers as customers as much as the businesses they deal
with.”); Charles Knapp, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The Gateway Thread—
AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1173 (2000) (“I think Jean Braucher has hit
the nail in precisely the right place—if arbitration is so economically sound for everybody,
then let the consumer be persuaded ‘once the dispute has arisen’ that arbitration is in her best
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gressive Position on arbitration agreements. The Very Progressive Position
would require the highest level of consent—post-dispute consent—before
enforcing individuals’ agreements to arbitrate and thus is at the Left end of
the continuum on the level of consent the law should require to trade away
the right to litigate.
The Very Progressive Position is the thrust of the Arbitration Fairness
Act, which would prohibit enforcement of consumers’ and employees’ pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. The Arbitration Fairness Act says “no predis-
pute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitra-
tion of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil
rights dispute.”100 The Arbitration Fairness Act is not targeted at adhesive
arbitration agreements; it attacks non-adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments as well. It would generally require that individuals’ arbitration agree-
ments be formed post-dispute to be enforceable.
D. The Moderately Progressive Position on Arbitration: Enforce Non-
Adhesive Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
The Moderately Progressive Position is targeted at adhesive arbitration
agreements, in contrast to the Very Progressive Position. While the Very Pro-
gressive Position would never enforce individuals’ pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, the Moderately Progressive Position would enforce an individ-
ual’s pre-dispute arbitration agreement if it is non-adhesive.101
interests too. The argument that ‘but then the consumer might have a lawyer’ obviously proves
too much.”).
100 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (as reported by the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, May 7, 2013).
101 For an articulation of the Moderately Progressive Position, see, for example, Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1431, 1434, 1440 (1991)
(defining “adhesion” as “take-it-or-leave-it,” and opposing enforcement when “[t]he arbitra-
tion clause is part of a contract of adhesion and the subject matter of the contract is vital to
contemporary human existence . . .”).
If, for example, all landlords in a neighborhood, city, or town included arbitration
clauses as part of their form leases, tenants could, if this defense applied, set aside
the arbitration provision absent some indicia of affirmative tenant consent or some
degree of bargaining and exchange. For example, if the landlord offered the apart-
ment at $550 per month when the tenant signed a lease providing for arbitration and
$600 per month when the tenant’s lease had no arbitration clause, this would indicate
choice and bargaining. Such contracts, even if the terms are standardized and non-
negotiable, may not even be contracts of adhesion because of the choice among
different forms and rental rates.
Id. at 1440; see also George H. Friedman, What’s a Regulator to Do? Mandatory Consumer
Arbitration, Dodd-Frank, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 2014, at 6 (“[E]nsure that consumers knowingly and voluntarily agree to arbi-
trate . . .” by enforcing consumers’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements only if they are “op-
tional,” that is, “[a] consumer cannot be denied goods or services if the consumer declines the
arbitration option . . . .”).
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Individuals rarely form non-adhesive pre-dispute contracts,102 including
non-adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements. For a hypothetical example
of a non-adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreement, consider a credit card
with a sixty-dollar annual fee. Suppose a month after the consumer receives
and starts using her card the card issuer offers her a five-dollar-per-year
rebate if she signs a document containing only an arbitration agreement (no
other terms) and then mails that arbitration agreement to the issuer. A con-
sumer who does that thereby forms a non-adhesive pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. It is non-adhesive because agreeing to arbitration was not neces-
sary for the consumer to get or keep using this credit card. The consumer
could have left the contract terms as they were (she pays sixty dollars per
year and retains her right to litigate) or pay fifty-five dollars per year while
replacing her right to litigate with a right to arbitrate. The price/arbitration
choice is up to the consumer, and it is the same credit card (with other con-
tract terms the same) whether the consumer chooses arbitration or not. The
consumer’s path of least resistance is the high-price/no-arbitration option,
because if the consumer does nothing but use her card then she pays sixty
dollars and has no duty to arbitrate. Or she can make it five dollars a year
cheaper if she goes through the snail-mail effort of signing the arbitration
agreement, finding a stamp and envelope, and putting it all in the custody of
the U.S. Postal Service.
A consumer who forms this hypothetical non-adhesive arbitration
agreement seems far more likely than a party who “adheres” to an adhesive
arbitration agreement (such as Buyer who signed Seller’s five-page form
contract above103) to realize she is agreeing to arbitrate, so we might describe
this consumer’s consent to arbitration as relatively “knowing” consent,104 in
contrast to the “blanket”105 adhesive consent Buyer gives to all the terms
102 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times
in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.” (footnote omit-
ted)); John E. Murray, Jr., The Judicial Vision of Contract: The Constructed Circle of Assent
and Unconscionability, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 263, 265 (2014) (“[V]irtually all consumer contracts
are ‘contracts of adhesion.’” (footnote omitted)); Zachary M. Rupiper, Note, Enforcement
Upon the Unwitting: The Overreaching Ability of Courts to Appoint Substitute Arbitration
Forums Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 411, 424 n.88 (2014) (“It is
important to note that most consumer contracts are contracts of adhesion, so negotiation gener-
ally does not occur.”).
103 See generally Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, supra note 72. R
104 Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability, supra note 21, at 469–74. “Courts should de- R
termine the enforceability of certain unbargained-for terms based on a concept I call ‘knowing
assent.’ Knowing assent means more than signing on the dotted line. Knowing assent requires
the following: (1) that the unbargained-for term be conspicuous; (2) that the importance of that
term be explained so that the adhering party understands its significance; and (3) that the
adhering party objectively manifests its assent to that term separately from its manifestation of
assent to undertaking a contractual obligation.” Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
105 Over fifty years ago, Karl Llewellyn described buyers’ consent to the sellers’ form
contracts as “specific” assent to the “few dickered terms” and “blanket” assent “to any not
unreasonable or indecent term the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate
the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.” KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
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(including arbitration) on Seller’s form contract. Also distinguishing this
consumer from Buyer, this consumer plainly gets something helpful in ex-
change for—and overtly tied to—agreeing to arbitrate, a five-dollar lower
price.
This hypothetical credit card pre-dispute arbitration agreement with the
five-dollar-per-year rebate is extremely unusual because, in contrast to this
hypothetical, most consumer arbitration agreements:
(1) are adhesive (presented to the consumer as an inseparable part of a
“take it or leave it” form contract), so the consumer must forgo the
entire transaction (credit, property, or service) with that business to
avoid agreeing to arbitrate;
(2) receive only the consumer’s blanket (adhesive) consent given gen-
erally to all the terms on a form contract by signing or otherwise
manifesting assent to it; and
(3) are not overtly tied to a price reduction or other contract term
plainly helpful to the consumer.
These distinctions do not matter under the Very Progressive Position, which
would refuse to enforce the hypothetical credit card arbitration agreement
simply because it was formed by an individual pre-dispute.106 In contrast, the
first of these distinctions is important under the Moderately Progressive Po-
sition, which would enforce the hypothetical credit card arbitration agree-
ment because it is non-adhesive. And the second and third of these
distinctions may be important for some versions of the Moderately Progres-
sive Position, as the following paragraphs explain.
While “non-adhesive consent” seems the most concise way to describe
the Moderately Progressive Position’s requirement for enforcement of an in-
dividual’s arbitration agreement, a fuller description would delve into the
many facts that might lead reasonable people to find an individual’s pre-
dispute consent to arbitration more meaningful than the blanket consent ad-
hering individuals usually give in one fell swoop to all the terms of adhesion
contracts.107 For example, some versions of the Moderately Progressive Posi-
tion would enforce the hypothetical credit card agreement only because post-
contracting effort by the consumer was required for her to be bound to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement. (The hypothetical consumer already had the
credit card and a contract with her card issuer when she chose to amend that
106 See supra Part III.C.
107 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or A Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 112, 119 (1993) (“[C]onsumer arbitration is a strong and effective dispute resolution
tool if . . . equal bargaining over terms is present.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381, 1406–07 (1996) (“[T]he legal system should focus on whether the consumer was
adequately informed and agreed to arbitrate . . . . If so, such agreements should ordinarily be
enforced.”).
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contract by mailing the arbitration agreement to the issuer.) In contrast, other
versions of the Moderately Progressive Position might enforce a variation of
the hypothetical in which the consumer’s original contract with the card is-
suer included an arbitration clause and required the consumer to take some
post-contracting effort to opt out of that arbitration clause. For example,
under current law some arbitration clauses that might otherwise be held un-
conscionable avoid that holding by giving the consumer a period of time
after contract formation to opt out of the arbitration clause.108
Going further, other versions of the Moderately Progressively Position
might enforce even adhesive arbitration agreements if the individual adher-
ent consents to the arbitration clause specifically, perhaps by signing or ini-
tialing the clause, and provides blanket consent to the contract (to all the
contract’s clauses), indicated by her signing the broader contract containing
the arbitration clause.109
On another front, some versions of the Moderately Progressive Position
would enforce the hypothetical arbitration agreement even if it lacked the
five-dollar-per-year price-reduction, while other versions of the Moderately
Progressive Position would make a price reduction, or other plainly-helpful
consideration overtly tied to the individual’s agreement to arbitrate, a re-
quirement for enforcing that agreement,110 and some versions of the Moder-
108 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002);
Owings v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1224 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“[T]hat the
consumer may opt-out of arbitration within thirty days of signing the agreement obviates any
argument of procedural unconscionability.”); Freedman v. Comcast Corp., 988 A.2d 68, 86
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (holding that arbitration provision was not procedurally uncon-
scionable as a contract of adhesion because of a clear and conspicuous opt-out provision); see
also Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Guadagno
had a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the Arbitration clause, which contained the class
action waiver, by notifying E*Trade in writing within 60 days of receiving the Agreement. The
Agreement highlighted the Arbitration clause, and the introduction to the Arbitration clause
highlighted the opt out term. Because the Arbitration clause containing the waiver was not
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but gave Guadagno sixty days to opt out, it was not
unconscionable.”).
109 See, e.g., Bell v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210 (Ct. App. 1994)
(“Further, we conclude that the enforceability of a compelled arbitration provision in a con-
tract of adhesion requires that the provision appear in clear and unmistakable form by high-
lighting, bold type, or with an opportunity for specific acknowledgment by initialing.”),
depublished by Bell v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 1994 LEXIS 4258 (Cal. July 28, 1994); Korobkin,
supra note 21, at 1246 (“[C]ourts could require sellers to procure specific assent to each R
boilerplate clause in a form contract, perhaps by having buyers initialize each paragraph.”);
Anthony M. Balloon, Comment, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Con-
tract Formation, and A New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EM-
ORY L.J. 905, 933 (2001) (“Requiring consumers to type their initials serves several functions.
First, initialing makes contracting more intentional. Initialing makes consumers stop and think
about what they are agreeing to, instead of the typical scenario in which a consumer haphaz-
ardly clicks buttons and links to complete the contracting process in the quickest manner
possible.”).
110 See, e.g., Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent
Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled
Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 511 (2009) (“[T]here is an even better
vehicle for ensuring contemplated consumer choice in accepting the arbitration clause: differ-
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ately Progressive Position might even enforce the arbitration agreement if it
was tied to a five-dollar price reduction but not if it was tied to a five-cent
price reduction.
In sum, the Moderately Progressive Position is actually a group of posi-
tions that require more than blanket consent to an adhesion contract (“adhe-
sive consent”) to trade away the right to litigate, but do not require post-
dispute consent. These Moderately Progressive Positions are therefore to the
right of the Very Progressive Position, which requires post-dispute consent,
and to the left of the Centrist Position, which generally requires only adhe-
sive (blanket) consent to form an enforceable arbitration agreement and thus
trade away the right to litigate.
E. The Centrist Position on Arbitration: Treat Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements Like Other Adhesion Contracts
As just discussed, the Centrist Position on arbitration (unlike both Pro-
gressive Positions) would generally enforce individuals’ adhesive arbitration
agreements. This is because the Centrist Position uses contract law’s stan-
dards of consent and, by those standards, most terms of most adhesion con-
tracts are the products of mutual consent. Consent in contract law is
generally objective rather than subjective.111 Specifically, contract law does
entiated pricing by acceptance or rejection at the point of sale. If pre-dispute agreements to
individual arbitration accomplish in practice what they should in theory—reduced litigation
costs to the business—these savings should be passed along to the consumer in the form of
lower prices for consumer products. In other words, the consumer who opts out of binding
arbitration in order to preserve a judicial forum and the class mechanism should have to pay a
premium in order to preserve potentially expensive litigation to the supplier. Despite the attrac-
tions of the differentiated pricing scheme, it has not yet been widely adopted, perhaps due to
administrative costs.”); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract:
A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers’ Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Con-
tracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 302 (1999) (proposing to amend FAA so enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements only applies to “a contract prepared by a merchant and offered
to a non-merchant if (1) additional consideration is provided by the merchant for the provision
of the contract concerning arbitration; and (2) the merchant provides information to the non-
merchant describing the procedural differences between, and all other factors which may dis-
tinguish the outcomes of, the arbitration process and litigation”).
111 See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 505,
527 (2008) (“Contract is animated by objective consent, then, because we cannot reliably
determine subjective consent and we need to be able to determine consent.”); Wayne Barnes,
The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2006) (“[U]nder the now-
dominant objective theory of contracts, subjective intention is irrelevant, and the lack thereof
should not prohibit the formation of a contract.”); Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of
Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3),
82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 252 (2007) (“The objective theory of contracts is the dominant theory
of mutual assent in modern contract law.”); Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1205 (“[G]iven the R
complexity of modern commerce . . . [a]ctual [subjective] assent to each contract term in a
transaction of any complexity simply is not possible.”); Lauren E. Miller, Breaking the Lan-
guage Barrier: The Failure of the Objective Theory to Promote Fairness in Language-Barrier
Contracting, 43 IND. L. REV. 175, 177 (2008) (“Since the late nineteenth century, courts have
applied the objective theory to determine which manifestations amount to assent to form a
contract.”); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
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not require knowing consent to each term on an adhesion contract, but rather
routinely enforces contract terms the adhering party probably did not know
about when forming the contract, unless she read the entire contract before
manifesting her consent to it by signing it, performing it, or some other man-
ifestation such as clicking “agree” on a website containing the contract
terms. Such manifestations of assent,112 plus consideration, are well estab-
lished as contract law’s requirements to form a contract.113 In short, contract
law’s objective consent standards enforce most adhesive contract terms,114
and thus would enforce most adhesive arbitration agreements.
Contract law’s objective consent standards enforce most, rather than all,
adhesive contract terms. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agree-
ment does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or
even to read the standard terms . . . . Customers do not in fact
ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms. They trust
to the good faith of the party using the form and to the tacit repre-
sentation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others
similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to
the terms not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as
the law may impose.115
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 542–43 (1971) (“Of course, a consensual theory of
contract does not require actual subjective consent to make a contract binding. It is enough that
both parties act, verbally or nonverbally, so as to give each other the reasonable expectation
that they understand the meaning which is manifested by either of them. That a person may
inadvertently manifest what he does not intend is a possibility which may produce unwanted
contracts but which does not reduce the consensual character of contract law. All consensual
processes are grounded on manifested rather than unmanifested thoughts, as, indeed, they must
be.”).
112 See, e.g., Francis J. Mootz III, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Contracting
in the Electronic Age, 4 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 271, 284 (2008) (“[C]ourts have
readily concluded that clicking an ‘I agree’ icon next to an electronic presentation of the seller’s
terms forms a contract and manifests the purchaser’s assent to those terms.”); Juliet M. Mor-
ingiello, Signals, Assent, and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1323 (2005)
(“Many courts analyzing click-wrap agreements have found the act of clicking an ‘I agree’
button to be an explicit manifestation of assent to contract terms.”); Warkentine, Beyond Un-
conscionability, supra note 21, at 471 (“Courts almost always find the requisite outward mani- R
festation of assent based on the act of signing a standard form contract.”); Alan M. White &
Cathy L. Manfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 250–51 (2002)
(“[J]udiciary’s response to adhesion contracts . . . still is to assume manifestation of assent and
to apply the ‘you signed it, you’re bound’ rule.”).
113
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
114 See Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1203, 1204 (“Contract law generally provides for the R
enforcement of the terms in form contracts, thus essentially allowing the drafting party (almost
always the seller in consumer contracts but sometimes the buyer in commercial contracts) to
create its own private law to govern its transactions. If the non-drafting party indicates his
general assent to the form, courts will enforce the terms contained therein whether or not that
party approves of the terms provided, understands those terms, has read them, or even has the
vaguest idea what the terms might be about. Limited exceptions are made to this rule, most
notably if the terms are found to be ‘unconscionable.’”).
115
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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What are these limitations? An important limitation is found in the Restate-
ment section corresponding to the comment just quoted. Section 211(3)
states that the customer does not assent to a form contract term if the seller
(the party regularly using the form) “has reason to believe that the [cus-
tomer] would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the
agreement contained the particular term.”116 This reasoning protects consum-
ers and others from much of the risk posed by form contracts. The consumer
does not need to worry that the form contains a term that is “bizarre or
oppressive,” “eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to,” or
“eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction,” because such terms
are not part of the contract.117
A related contract law doctrine is unconscionability. Unconscionability
is often thought of as coming in two forms: substantive and procedural.118
Substantive unconscionability refers simply to contract terms that are “un-
reasonably favorable” to one side.119 Procedural unconscionability deals
with the process of contract formation, encompassing “not only the employ-
ment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted language,
but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power.”120
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that
both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required
before courts will grant relief from a challenged term. Judicial de-
cisions have not consistently followed this principle, however, and
some courts have suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in
which a large amount of one type of unconscionability can make
up for only a small amount of the other.121
116 Id. § 211 cmt. f.
117 Id.; see also Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
627, 639 (2002) (“[P]arties who sign forms or click ‘I agree’ are manifesting their consent to
be bound by the unread terms in the forms. They would rather run the risk of agreeing to
unread terms than either (a) decline to agree or (b) read the terms. Refusing to enforce all of
these terms would violate their freedom to contract. But parties who click ‘I agree’ are not
realistically manifesting their assent to radically unexpected terms. Enforcing such an unread
term would violate the parties’ freedom from contract.”).
118 Murray, Jr., Judicial Vision of Contract, supra note 102, at 265 (“[T]he current fash- R
ion inevitably describes unconscionability as ‘procedural’ or ‘substantive.’”).
119 See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990); Murray, Jr., Judi-
cial Vision of Contract, supra note 102, at 266 (“Substantive unconscionability is concerned R
with whether a contract, or a term of a contract, is overly harsh, one-sided, or manifests an
outrageous degree of unfairness.”).
120
FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, at § 4.28; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON- R
TRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Murray, Jr., Judicial Vision of Contract, supra note 102, R
at 265 (“‘Procedural’ unconscionability is concerned with the circumstances under which the
contract was negotiated and formed including the conspicuous or inconspicuous form in which
the allegedly unconscionable term is found and, in particular, whether a genuine negotiation
occurred, versus a take-it-or-leave-it demand that precluded any choice by the party with infer-
ior bargaining power. Where only one party dictates the terms, the agreement is a ‘contract of
adhesion’ which is ‘procedurally’ unconscionable.”).
121 Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for
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That a contract is adhesive greatly increases the likelihood a court will find it
procedurally unconscionable, and some courts go as far as “equat[ing] the
finding of a contract of adhesion with the finding of procedural unconsciona-
bility.”122 So contract law’s unconscionability doctrine—and its related doc-
trine summarized in Restatement Section 211(3)—keep contract law’s
standards of consent from enforcing all adhesive contract terms. By incorpo-
rating these consent standards, the Centrist Position on arbitration would en-
force most, but not nearly all, adhesive arbitration agreements.
In sum, the Centrist Position on arbitration adopts contract law’s stan-
dards of consent and thus requires a lower level of consent to trade away the
right to litigate than do the two Progressive Positions. In contrast to the two
Progressive Positions—which would never enforce individuals’ pre-dispute
arbitration agreements (the Very Progressive Position) or would only enforce
them when non-adhesive (the Moderately Progressive Position)—the Cen-
trist Position would use contract law’s standards of consent and thus enforce
most adhesive arbitration agreements.123 In other words, the Centrist Position
on arbitration does not require post-dispute consent or non-adhesive, pre-
dispute consent to trade away the right to litigate. For the Centrist Position,
pre-dispute consent is usually (but not nearly always) sufficient, even if it is
merely the adhesive (blanket) consent consumers generally give to all the
terms on a form contract by signing or otherwise manifesting assent to it.
F. The Moderately Conservative Position on Arbitration:
The Separability Doctrine
The Centrist Position requires a higher standard of consent than the
Moderately Conservative position. This is because the Centrist Position bor-
rows from contract law both its standards of consent and its defenses to
enforcement. In contrast, the Moderately Conservative Position borrows
contract law’s standards of consent, but rejects contract law’s defenses. To
put it more precisely, the Centrist Position applies to the right to litigate both
contract law’s (relatively low) standards of consent and contract law’s main
tools to police the sometimes harsh results of those low standards of con-
sent—defenses such as misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability, and il-
legality (or “public policy”). In contrast, the Moderately Conservative
Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1, 11–13 (2012) (discussing conventional requirement to make a strong showing of both
forms of unconscionability, and sliding scale’s similar requirement that both forms be present,
however a lesser showing of one form may be acceptable with a large amount of the other
form present); John E. Murray, Jr., Revised Article 2: Eliminating the “Battle” and Unconscio-
nability, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 593, 606–08 (2011) (discussing requirement of most courts that
both substantive and procedural unconscionability be present, and a “sliding scale” approach
that allows a large amount of one form of unconscionability to make up for a lack of the
other).
122 See Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability, supra note 21. R
123 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (2004).
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Position removes from the right to litigate the protection of those defenses,
leaving just contract law’s relatively low consent standards.
For instance, consider this Article’s earlier hypothetical.124 If Buyer
signs Seller’s five-page adhesion contract containing thirty clauses, one of
which is an arbitration clause, the Centrist Position likely treats that as suffi-
cient consent to trade away the right to litigate125 unless Buyer asserts a
defense to the enforcement of the contract.126 If Buyer does assert such a
defense, then the Centrist Position would not treat Buyer as having traded
away her right to litigate until a court hears the defense and concludes that
its elements are not present.127 In other words, the Centrist Position would
keep the courthouse door open to parties asserting defenses to enforcement
of their contracts containing arbitration clauses.128
In contrast, the Moderately Conservative Position on arbitration would
close that door. Under the Moderately Conservative Position, if Buyer as-
serts a defense to enforcement of the five-page adhesion contract, its arbitra-
tion clause nevertheless trades away the right to litigate. As examples, under
the Moderately Conservative Position if Buyer asserts that her consent to the
five-page adhesion contract was induced by misrepresentation or duress a
court would not hear that defense, but rather send the dispute to arbitration
where Buyer could argue the defense to the arbitrator.129 And if Buyer as-
serts that the five-page adhesion contract requires her to pay an unconsciona-
bly high interest rate or a usurious (illegal) interest rate, then under the
Moderately Conservative Position a court would not hear that defense, but
rather send the dispute to arbitration where Buyer could argue the defense to
the arbitrator.130
124 See supra Section III.C.
125 I say “likely” because of contract doctrines like procedural unconscionability and RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See supra notes
116–122 and accompanying text. R
126 Such an assertion is most likely to occur in opposition to a motion to compel arbitra-
tion. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
127 In other words, only an enforceable contract is enough to alienate the right to litigate
under the Centrist Position; an allegedly unenforceable contract is not enough.
128 Only after a court hears and rejects those asserted defenses does the court relegate the
unwilling party to arbitration.
129 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (hold-
ing that the Federal Arbitration Act “does not permit the federal court to consider claims of
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally”); SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc.,
707 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Condominium Association’s coercion claim is arbi-
trable because it is a challenge to the validity (rather than the formation) of the [contract
containing the arbitration clause].”); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex.
2001) (“The defenses of unconscionability, duress, fraudulent inducement, and revocation . . .
must specifically relate to the Arbitration Addendum itself, not the contract as a whole, if they
are to defeat arbitration. Defenses that pertain to the entire installment contract can be arbi-
trated.”); Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Lopez, 162 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 2005) (“[D]uress . . .
issue relates to the contract as a whole and not solely the arbitration provision. It is therefore
an issue to be decided in arbitration.”).
130 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006).
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Despite the possibility Buyer could prove any of these defenses, the
Moderately Conservative Position nevertheless holds that the arbitration
clause of the contract alienates Buyer’s right to litigate. The Moderately Con-
servative Position reaches this conclusion by treating the arbitration clause
as a separately-enforceable agreement from the contract containing it, so if
Buyer’s defense is not focused on the arbitration clause in particular, then the
court enforces that clause as an agreement to arbitrate disputes about
whether there is a defense to enforcement of the broader contract containing
that clause.131 Treating the arbitration clause as a separately enforceable
agreement is usually called the “separability doctrine,”132 and having it
removes from the right to litigate the protection of the contract defenses. The
Moderately Conservative Position supports the separability doctrine and thus
would require a lower level of consent to trade away the right to litigate than
would the Centrist Position and the two Progressive Positions.
G. The Very Conservative Position: Converting Some Arbitration
Agreements into Exculpatory Clauses
Under the Moderately Conservative Position if an agreement to arbi-
trate is enforced then that agreement’s terms are generally subject to the
same limits as other contracts about what rights (other than the right to liti-
gate) can be traded away pre-dispute.133 In contrast, the Very Conservative
Position would exempt arbitration agreements from some of those limits. In
particular, the Very Conservative Position exempts arbitration agreements
from limits relating to (1) appealing legally-erroneous decisions, and
(2) class actions. By removing these limits, the Very Conservative Position
effectively converts some adhesive arbitration agreements into exculpatory
clauses and enforces them in circumstances in which comparable non-arbi-
131 In Buckeye, the Supreme Court held “that, regardless of whether the challenge is
brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.” Id. at 449. Decades earlier, the
Court stated that if Prima Paint had argued that there was fraud “directed to the arbitration
clause itself,” Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402, then Prima Paint would have been entitled
to a trial on that issue, but was in fact not entitled to a trial because it made a “claim[ ] of
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally,” id. at 404.
132 Buckeye uses the term “severability,” Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445, rather than “separa-
bility.” Interestingly, courts seem to have a slight preference for the former term, while schol-
ars seem to have a stronger preference for the latter. On August 16, 2015, searches in Westlaw
revealed 82 cases and 223 secondary sources with the search “arbitration & ‘severability doc-
trine’” and 80 cases and 362 secondary sources with the search “arbitration & ‘separability
doctrine.’”
133 Exceptions to this generalization may relate to the three topics noted in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion: agreements relating to discovery, evidence and jury. 563 U.S. 333, 343
(2011). Under current law, arbitration agreements may be less limited than non-arbitration
agreements with respect to these three topics. For example, a pre-dispute contract term reduc-
ing discovery, reducing evidentiary rules, or eliminating the possibility of jury trial may be
enforced under lower standards of consent if found in an arbitration agreement than in a non-
arbitration agreement.
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tration agreements would be unenforceable. In this respect, the Very Con-
servative Position thus would require a lower level of consent than would the
Moderately Conservative Position.
1. Legally-Erroneous Decisions
Consider a hypothetical pre-dispute contract that does not have an arbi-
tration clause. Instead, the contract provides that litigation of any disputes
shall end with the trial court’s judgment. In other words, the contract in-
cludes an agreement not to appeal. Because the primary purpose of appeal is
to correct legal errors by the trial court,134 a contract clause prohibiting ap-
peal essentially consents to the enforcement of legally erroneous decisions
by the trial court. While such a clause might not indicate the parties’ consent
to a trial court intentionally or negligently reaching a legally erroneous deci-
sion, trial courts sometimes make errors of law; when that occurs a contract
clause prohibiting appeal would be the parties’ consent to enforcement of
that legally erroneous decision. Such a contract clause would be extremely
unusual and probably unenforceable.135 In other words, a general limit on
contract terms is that they cannot contract away the right to correct legally
erroneous decisions of the trial court, the initial adjudicator.136
However, the Very Conservative Position would remove this limit from
arbitration agreements by enforcing arbitration agreements that contract
away the right to correct legally-erroneous decisions of the initial adjudica-
tor, the arbitrator. The Very Conservative Position would do this by having
courts confirm and enforce arbitration awards without reviewing those
awards to determine whether the arbitrator correctly applied substantive law.
If the arbitrator made an error of law and that error resulted in denying a
claim that would have prevailed under a correct decision of law, then a court
confirming and enforcing the award allows the arbitration agreement to have
134 Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV.
683, 707 (2013) (“Error correction is the other traditional function of appeals courts. Gener-
ally, in American courts, the error-correction function is limited to issues of law, and trial court
decisions of fact are rarely reviewed.” (citing McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20
(1954))); Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1141 (2012) (“The near-exclusive focus on legal issues at the
appellate level suggests that the legal system of the United States primarily values appellate
review for its role in lawmaking . . . . [The system] devote[s] fewer appellate resources to this
review for factual errors.” (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY 36 (1930))).
135 See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms
Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 492–93 (2013).
136 See id. Colter Paulson searched for cases involving such provisions and concluded that
“[o]utside of the arbitration context, there are very few cases dealing with pre-dispute waivers
of the right to appeal.” Id. In fact, Paulson found only two cases since 1928, one of which he
concluded “was simply a weak attempt to call a payment provision an appellate waiver and
was rejected as such.” Id. The other case involved an agreement that was not truly pre-dispute
(a property settlement agreement, in anticipation of divorce, between spouses who had already
separated), let alone pre-dispute and adhesive. Id. Therefore, it seems no reported case since
1928 involves a truly pre-dispute contract provision prohibiting appeal.
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the same effect as an exculpatory clause: a claim that would have won but
for a pre-dispute contract clause loses because that clause is enforced.
In short, arbitration clauses can operate like exculpatory clauses, unless
courts police arbitrators’ legally-erroneous awards like appellate courts po-
lice trial courts’ legally-erroneous decisions: with de novo review on ques-
tions of law. While appellate courts give de novo review to trial courts’
rulings on questions of law,137 the Very Conservative Position supports
highly deferential judicial review of arbitrators’ rulings on questions of
law.138 In sum, the Very Conservative Position exempts arbitration agree-
ments from otherwise-applicable law prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to
comply with, rather than appeal, legally erroneous decisions.
2. Class Action “Waivers”
The Very Conservative Position would also exempt arbitration agree-
ments from otherwise-applicable law relating to class actions. Whether a
contract includes an arbitration clause or not, the contract may have lan-
guage by which the parties purport to “waive” (actually trade away139) their
137 Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical
Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012) (“The decisions in the first category—questions of
law—are reviewed ‘de novo’ by the appellate court, meaning that the appellate court is not
required or expected to give any deference to the trial court. . . . In contrast to legal conclu-
sions, factual determinations by the trial court are reviewed deferentially. Appellate review of
factual findings by the district court is limited to whether those findings are ‘clearly erroneous,’
a very high bar to reverse a trial judge’s factual findings.”); David Frisch, Contractual Choice
of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 77 (2003)
(“Traditionally, questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact are reviewable
only on a clearly erroneous basis.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1831 (2013) (“Appellate courts review questions of
law de novo. . . . In contrast, appellate courts defer to trial court fact-finding.” (citing J. ERIC
SMITHBURN, APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 8 (2009))); Leandra Lederman,
(Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1886 (2014) (“Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) governs the standard of review of findings of fact in district court
bench trials; Rule 52(a)(6) states that ‘findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evi-
dence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.’ The standard of re-
view on legal issues appealed from the district courts is de novo.”).
138 See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (“[T]he
grounds for vacatur and modification provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive.”);
id. at 588 (viewing the FAA’s provisions on confirmation and vacatur of arbitration awards “as
substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to
maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading
opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitra-
tion merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and
bring arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process”). In contrast, the Moderately Con-
servative, Centrist, and Progressive Positions support less deferential judicial review of arbitra-
tors’ rulings on at least some questions of law and thus would be more likely to vacate legally-
erroneous arbitration awards. See infra note 146. R
139 See Ware, Contractual Waivers, supra note 123, at 205. R
One can alienate one’s rights in two ways: in exchange for consideration or in the
absence of consideration. To put it another way, one can trade away one’s rights, or
one can give away one’s rights. In some legal contexts, such as contract law, the term
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rights to be part of a class action. Such a contract may say something like the
parties “waive their rights to serve as a representative, as a private attorney
general, or in any other representative capacity, and/or to participate as a
member of a class of claimants.”140 If this sort of language is in a contract
with an arbitration clause, then it is often called an “arbitral class waiver.” If
this sort of language is in a contract without an arbitration clause, then it
may be a called a “non-arbitral class waiver.”
The Very Conservative Position holds that adhesive arbitral class waiv-
ers should be enforced under circumstances in which non-arbitral class
waivers would be unenforceable.141 In contrast, the Moderately Conservative
Position and Centrist Position would enforce adhesive arbitral class waivers
only in circumstances in which non-arbitral adhesive class waivers would be
enforced; and the Progressive Positions would never enforce adhesive arbi-
tral class waivers because they would not enforce adhesive arbitration agree-
ments at all. In short, the Very Conservative Position would remove from
arbitration agreements the limits on class waivers that apply to non-arbitra-
tion agreements. The Very Conservative Position would remove otherwise-
applicable law prohibiting class waivers under a fairly wide range of
circumstances.
In sum, the Very Conservative Position is at the Right end of the contin-
uum of five positions on arbitration because only the Very Conservative Po-
sition would (1) enforce pre-dispute adhesive arbitration agreements,
(2) contained in contracts that might be unenforceable due to a contract de-
fense, (3) while removing from those arbitration agreements otherwise-ap-
plicable limits relating to appealing legally erroneous decisions and to class
waivers.
IV. CURRENT LAW’S PLACE ON THE CONTINUUM
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Current law adopts the Very Conservative Position. Under current law:
“waiver” is often used to refer only to giving away one’s rights. Standard accounts
of contract law, for example, carefully distinguish the “waiver” of contractual rights,
which does not require consideration, from the “modification” of contractual rights,
which does.
Id. (citing FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, at § 8.5). For this reason, “class waiver” is a mis- R
leading term to the extent “waiver” implies alienating a right for nothing in return; if the
alienating occurs through a contract term then it is better understood as a trade than a waiver.
140 Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO SERVE AS A REPRESENTATIVE, AS A PRI-
VATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OR IN ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY,
AND/OR TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF A CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, IN ANY
LAWSUIT FILED AGAINST US AND/OR RELATED THIRD PARTIES.”).
141 See infra notes 142–143. R
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(1) Courts enforce adhesive arbitration agreements against consumers,
employees, and other individuals.142
(2) Courts apply the separability doctrine so arbitrators, rather than
courts, initially hear defenses to the enforcement of the contracts
containing adhesive arbitration agreements, and sometimes even to
the enforcement of the arbitration agreement itself.143
(3) Courts confirm and enforce arbitration awards without determining
whether the arbitrator correctly applied the law.144
(4) Adhesive arbitration agreements’ class waivers are enforced in cir-
cumstances in which such waivers in a non-arbitration agreement
would, at least until the Supreme Court’s 2011 Concepcion deci-
sion, be unenforceable.145 So Concepcion and Amex made adhesive
142 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1987);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984). In Gilmer, an important group on the
Right, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, filed an amicus curiae brief for enforcement of the
agreement, that is, in support of respondents, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation. See Brief
for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18), 1990 WL 10009002.
143 See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010); Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). In both Buckeye and Rent-A-Center, an important
group on the Right, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, filed an amicus curiae brief for enforce-
ment of the agreement, that is, in support of the petitioners. See Brief for Chamber of Com-
merce of the U.S. and the Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (No. 04-1264), 2005 WL
1976706; Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL
783668.
144 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (“[T]he grounds for
vacatur and modification provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive.”); see also id. at
588 (viewing the FAA’s provisions on confirmation and vacatur of arbitration awards “as sub-
stantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to main-
tain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens
the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render informal arbitration
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process and bring
arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process”).
145 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (citing America
Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)) (holding that
the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California law refusing to enforce adhesive arbitration
agreement requiring claims to be brought on an individual, rather than class, basis while ac-
knowledging that California law would not, under similar circumstances, enforce such a re-
quirement in a non-arbitration agreement); id. (“The unavailability of class action relief in this
context is sufficient in and by itself to preclude enforcement of the TOS forum selection
clause.”); see also Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 WL 1704469, at
*81 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (invalidating non-arbitral class waiver); Elhilu v. Quizno’s
Franchising Co., No. 06-cv-7855, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109435, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3,
2008) (same); In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 F.R.D. 459, 469–70 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to hold
nonarbitral class waiver enforceable as a matter of law in commercial case and denying motion
for summary judgment pending “more developed evidentiary record”). Research revealed
only one pre-Concepcion case enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver, Bonanno v. Quizno’s
Franchise Co., No. 06-cv-02358, 2009 WL 1068744, at *22 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009). But
some courts did enforce forum-selection clauses choosing a forum that did not permit class
actions. See, e.g., Koch v. America Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (D. Md. 2000)
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arbitration agreements more enforceable than other adhesion con-
tracts with respect to class waivers.146 Concepcion and Amex al-
lowed businesses to do with adhesive arbitration agreements what
other adhesion contracts generally could not do: contain enforcea-
ble pre-dispute class waivers.
While current law is at one extreme (the Very Conservative Position),
the main alternative that has received significant support in Congress147 is
the other extreme, the Very Progressive Position, of not enforcing individu-
als’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements at all. Under the Very Progressive
Position:
(concluding that unavailability of class actions in Virginia is insufficient reason to refuse to
enforce Virginia forum-selection clause); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007,
1012 (D.C. 2002) (same); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (per curiam) (same); Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464–65 (Md.
1997) (same); see also American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312
(2013) (holding that an enforceable adhesive arbitration agreement precluded class arbitration
or class litigation under circumstances in which a non-arbitration agreement purporting to have
that effect would not likely have been enforced); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010) (interpreting an arbitration agreement’s silence on class arbi-
tration as a prohibition of it, whereas other contracts’ silence on class actions is not generally
understood to be a prohibition of them, or at least was not so understood before Stolt-Nielsen
and Concepcion). In Concepcion, Stolt-Nielsen, and Italian Colors, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, an important group on the Right, filed an amicus curiae brief for enforcement of the
agreement, that is, in support of the petitioners. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S. and Business Roundtable as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 6759408; Brief for
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3167313; Brief for Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2875374.
146 See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use
of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 964 (2014) (“Un-
like arbitral class waivers, nonarbitral class waivers likely remain subject to state unconsciona-
bility challenges.”); see also id. at 975 (“[A] nonarbitral class waiver . . . poses greater risks
of court invalidation. After Concepcion, the FAA provides a substantial degree of protection
for arbitral class waivers; nonarbitral class waivers have no such federal law backing. As a
result, a number of courts, although certainly not all have refused to enforce nonarbitral class
waivers.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-
Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 389
(2011) (“The [Concepcion] Court majority could . . . [have struck] down the arbitration
provision [with its class waiver], paving the way for a class action in court. Had there been a
class-action waiver without the arbitration provision, that would presumably have been the
result.”); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN.
L. REV. 767, 782–84 (2012) (discussing cases upholding class action waivers based on FAA
preemption even if state law would invalidate such waivers); U.S. Supreme Court Issues Sig-
nificant New Decision Regarding Class Action Litigation, WSGR Alert, WILSON SONSINI
GOODRICH & ROSATI (Apr. 28, 2011) https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?Section
Name=publications/pdfsearch/wsgralert_class_action_litigation.htm [https://perma.cc/6EN2-
JBZQ] (“While class waivers outside of arbitration agreements are likely not valid in Califor-
nia, and many other states, [Concepcion] provides powerful ammunition to companies that
would prefer to resolve claims through individual arbitration rather than through the court
system.”).
147 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 133th Cong. (2013); supra text accompa-
nying note 35. R
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(1) Courts would not enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements—let
alone adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements—against con-
sumers, employees and other individuals.148
(2) But, if the law did enforce such arbitration agreements, then courts
would be able initially to hear defenses to their enforcement and to
the enforcement of the contracts containing them, thus rejecting the
separability doctrine.149
(3) At least some arbitrators’ errors of law would be grounds for vacat-
ing the resulting award.150
(4) Adhesive arbitration agreements’ class waivers would not be en-
forced at all.151
148 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, at § 3 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration
of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”).
149 Id. (“The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and
enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a court,
rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the
arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing
such agreement.”).
150 Proposals to increase vacatur due to arbitrators’ legal errors come less from legislators
than from scholars. See, e.g., Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1353 (2011) (“[A]rbitrators should be required to issue written awards in
mandatory arbitrations, and nondrafting parties should be able to challenge those awards for
legal error.”); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons
from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 120–21 (2007) (“When arbitrators decide
questions raising mandatory legal rules . . . there is no logical reason to exempt it from the
procedural guarantees that apply in every other adjudicative context. One of those guarantees
is a right to some level of meaningful review.”); Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory
Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
157, 157–58 (1989) (“[C]ourts should have clear authority, when statutory claims are in-
volved, to vacate or modify an arbitrator’s award where arbitral procedures denied an adequate
hearing or where the arbitrator made a [sic] error of law.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetric
Dynamism and Acceptable Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIA-
TION 1, 52 (2013) (asserting that there is “a strong case for providing broader judicial review
of arbitration awards stemming from modern mass arbitrations and vacating them when they
make errors of law or fact that would result in reversal of trial court decisions containing the
same errors”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 739 (1999) (“[C]ourts should review arbitrators’
legal rulings on claims arising out of mandatory rules, but not on claims arising out of default
rules.”); id. at 704 (“The [Supreme] Court must either reverse its decisions that claims arising
under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable, or require de novo judicial review of arbitra-
tor’s legal rulings on such claims.”); Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbi-
tration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 207
(2012) (noting that several scholars have “begun to urge more rigorous judicial review [of
arbitration awards] in the disparate party context,” that is, the context in which one party is a
“more powerful repeat player,” typically a business, and the other is a “one-time player,”
typically a consumer or employee of the business).
151 The CFPB is considering a proposal that “would ban companies from including arbi-
tration clauses that block class action lawsuits in their consumer contracts.” CFPB Considers
Proposal to Ban Arbitration Clauses that Allow Companies to Avoid Accountability to Their
Customers, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015) http://www.consumerfinance
.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-proposal-to-ban-arbitration-clauses-that-allow-companies-to-
avoid-accountability-to-their-customers/ [https://perma.cc/8M22-4RWB]. Similarly, the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act would have this effect because it would render unenforceable nearly all
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While current law is at one extreme, and the main reform with support
in Congress would go to the other extreme, this Article proposes the Centrist
Position in between the extremes. This Article proposes:
(1) Courts should enforce adhesive arbitration agreements against con-
sumers, employees, and other individuals.152
(2) But, courts should be able initially to hear defenses to enforcement
of adhesive arbitration agreements and to enforcement of the con-
tracts containing them, thus rejecting the separability doctrine.153
(3) Courts should vacate legally erroneous arbitration awards arising
out of adhesive and other pre-dispute arbitration agreements, if the
arbitrator’s error was on a claim arising out of mandatory law, as
opposed to a default rule.154
(4) Adhesive arbitration agreements’ class waivers should be enforced
only under circumstances in which non-arbitral class waivers
would be enforced.155
These proposals—the Centrist Position—could eventually be adopted by
Congress in a statute or by the Supreme Court. More immediate, however, is
the prospect of a CFPB rule. Therefore, this Article’s Appendix contains the
language of a rule the CFPB could adopt to enact into law the reforms advo-
cated in this Article. While this rule might be challenged as exceeding the
Bureau’s authority, such a challenge should fail because the Dodd-Frank Act
broadly authorizes the Bureau to “prohibit or impose conditions or limita-
tions on the use of” pre-dispute arbitration agreements in many consumer
adhesive arbitration agreements, whether or not parties seek to assert claims on a class basis.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text. A more moderate proposal by Sarah Rudolph Cole R
would retain enforceability of adhesive arbitration agreements while negating their class waiv-
ers. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 493 (2011) (argu-
ing that the Arbitration Fairness Act’s “[e]liminating predispute arbitration agreements signed
by consumers and employees is excessively overbroad”); id. at 498 (proposing “Consumer
Class Action and Class Arbitration Waiver Reform Act” which states: “An arbitration agree-
ment between a consumer and a provider of goods or services is invalid to the extent that it
precludes the consumer from accessing the court or arbitral system to participate in a class
action as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23”); see also id. at 497 (“Class actions
may be brought under circumstances in which they are necessary for the parties to be able to
vindicate their legal rights.” (quoting Lew Maltby, Model Arbitration Act (on file with Hous-
ton Law Review))).
152 See Ware, The Case for Enforcing, supra note 72, at 253. R
153 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 134 (2007).
154 See Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, supra note 72, at 72. R
155 This Article proposes not the Progressive position that would prohibit enforcement of
adhesive arbitration agreements’ class waivers but the more centrist position that such provi-
sions be as enforceable as they would be if contained in a non-arbitration agreement. For other
moderate positions on class waivers, see supra note 146. R
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financial services contracts.156 The proposed rule would impose conditions
and limitations on such agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The basic principle behind the Centrist Position is that, with few and
relatively uncontroversial exceptions,157 adhesive arbitration agreements
should be as enforceable as other adhesion contracts, but not more so. In
other words, this Article rejects conservative-supported anomalies that en-
force adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion con-
tracts, and proposes—contrary to the position advocated by progressives—
that once these anomalies are fixed, adhesive arbitration agreements should
be as generally enforceable as other adhesion contracts.
This would have several beneficial effects. First, it would protect con-
sumers and other individuals from enforcement of contracts that, outside the
arbitration context, our law would not enforce because of the presence of a
contract-law defense, a prohibition on appealing legally-erroneous decisions,
or a prohibition on class actions. Second, it would protect the freedom of
individuals and other parties to choose, within the bounds of generally appli-
cable law, what agreements to make, and thus what set of rights and duties
to acquire. Finally, it would strengthen arbitration as an alternative process
of dispute resolution, providing healthy competition to government courts
and facilitating access to justice for a variety of claims.
156 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct.
665, 672 (2012) (describing 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) as “granting authority to the newly created
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate predispute arbitration agreements in con-
tracts for consumer financial products or services”).
157 See supra note 133 (discussing discovery, evidence, and jury). R
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APPENDIX: A PROPOSED CFPB RULE
This Article proposes that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau adopt
the following rule. It uses terms, such as “covered person” and “consumer,”
defined in the Dodd-Frank Act.158
1. Notwithstanding any law or agreement to the contrary:
a. An agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between the parties is enforceable save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
b. Whether such agreement or ground exists shall, on request of a
party to such alleged agreement, be determined by a court, rather
than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitra-
tion challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunc-
tion with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.
c. If such agreement requires claims to be brought on an individual,
rather than class, basis then such requirement shall be as enforceable
as such a requirement in a non-arbitration agreement would be under
similar circumstances.
2. In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration awards, a state
or federal court shall vacate an award arising out of an agreement be-
tween a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial prod-
uct or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between
the parties where the award was based on the arbitrators’ error of law
and, at the time of their most recent agreement submitting the contro-
versy to arbitration, the parties could not have formed an enforceable
contract to avoid such law.
Comment: This proposal is intended to overrule (with respect to agree-
ments within the Bureau’s jurisdiction) the holding or possible implica-
tions of the following cases:
1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967).
2. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
3. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576
(2008).
158 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (2012).
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4. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp., 559 U.S.
662 (2010).
5. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
6. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011).
7. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013).
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